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COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE IN WEST VIRGINIA:
BEYOND BRADLEY TO PURE COMPARATIVE FAULT
JEFF L. LEWIN*t
I.

INTRODUCTION

West Virginia's "system" of comparative negligence is ripe for legislative
reform. As Mr. James Stoneking notes in a recent Article,' West Virginia is
the only comparative negligence jurisdiction that has no statutory system governing contribution among joint tortfeasors. Of the forty-two states that have,
adopted systems of "comparative negligence,''2 West Virginia is one of only
ten to have done so by judicial decision. 3 Moreover, West Virginia is the only
state whose judiciary adopted a "modified" rule of comparative negligence,

*
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Research support for this Article was provided by the Arthur B. Hodges Education Trust of the
West Virginia University College of Law.
t Copyright 1987 by Jeff L. Lewin.
I Stoneking, Beyond Bradley: A Critique of Comparative Contribution in West Virginia and Proposals for Legislative Reform, 89 W. VA. L. REv. 167 (1986).
2 V. SCHWARTZ, ComPARATrvE NEGUiGENCE (2d ed. 1986); H. WOODS, Coma,
vA FAULT (1979
& Supp. 1986); Sobelsohn, "Pure" vs. Modified Comparative Negligence: Notes on the Debate, 34
EmoRY L.J. 65 (1985). Alabama, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and the District
of Columbia retain the contributory negligence defense in its traditional form. Nebraska and South
Dakota retain the contributory negligence defense except when the plaintiff's negligence is "slight" and
the defendant's is "gross." Tennessee retains the defense except when the plaintiff's negligence is "remote" and thus not truly the proximate cause.
I The ten states that have adopted comparative negligence by judicial decision are: Alaska, Kaatz
v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alaska 1975); California, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal.3d 804, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 532 P.2d 1226 (1975); Florida, Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So.2d 431 (Fla. 1973); Illinois, Alvis v.
kibar, 85 Ill.2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981); Iowa, Goetzman v. Wichern, 327 N.W.2d 742 (Iowa
1982)(superseded by statute, IowA CODE ANN. § 668 (1984)); Kentucky, Hilen v. Hays, 673 S.W.2d 713
(Ky. 1984); Michigan, Kirby v. Larson, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400 (1977), Placek v. City of Sterling
Heights, 405 Mich. 607, 275 N.W.2d 511 (1979); Missouri, Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo.
1983); New Mexico, Scott v. Rizzo, 96 N.M. 682, 634 P.2d 1234 (1981); and West Virginia, Bradley
v. Appalachian Power Co., 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879 (1979). Among the ten states with judiciallyadopted systems of comparative negligence, seven already had statutory provisions governing contribution, and two others subsequently enacted provisions governing contribution. Stoneking, supra note
1, at 167-68 nn.7-9.
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under which the plaintiff4 is denied recovery if his share of the applicable fault
is fifty percent or more.

Mr. Stoneking's Article ably summarizes the development of West Virginia's law of comparative negligence subsequent to its adoption by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in Bradley v. Appalachian Power Co.s He
concludes by recommending legislative adoption of five particular proposals
governing comparative contribution. 6 Although Mr. Stoneking's analysis is
commendable, his proposals in some respects do not go far enough, while in
others they go too far. In part, the shortcomings may reflect the author's perspective as a member of the defense bar.7 In more important respects, however,
Mr. Stoneking's analysis falls short because he fails to follow his premises
through to their logical conclusions. In particular, Mr. Stoneking recognizes
that the modern rule of comparative fault is based on the principle of "loss
allocation."8 Consistent pursuit of loss allocation would require two substantial
modifications of the law- as it has developed in West Virginia.
First, among defendants, West Virginia law currently denies contribution
to defendants who are guilty of aggravated misconduct, i.e., intentional, willful,

I Bradley, 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879. The other nine state courts, as well as seven state
legislatures, have adopted the "pure" form of comparative negligence, under which the plaintiff's recovery is reduced in proportion to his share of the total negligence of the parties. There are two forms
of modified comparative negligence. West Virginia has adopted the "Wisconsin rule," under which the
plaintiff's recovery is diminished in proportion to his negligence if his share of the total negligence is
"less than" that of the defendants; recovery is completely barred if the plaintiff's negligence is greater
than or equal to that of the defendants. The more common form of modified comparative negligence,
known as the "New Hampshire rule," allows the plaintiff to recover proportionately diminished damages
if his share of the total negligence is "not greater than" the defendants; recovery is completely barred
only if his negligence is greater than that of the defendants.
5 Bradley, 163 W. Va. 332, 256 S.E.2d 879.
6 His reconmendations are as follows:

(1) To define broadly the class of parties who may assert contribution, so as to include all
but intentional tortfeasors;
(2) To establish "absence of collusion" as the standard by which to measure the enforceability
of a settlement agreement in multi-party litigation;
(3) To provide that a settlement obtained in the absence of collusion extinguishes all claims
for contribution by or against a settling party;
(4) To provide that where fewer than all defendants settle, a verdict rendered against the nonsettling defendants will be reduced by the greater of: (a) the amount of the settlement, or (b)
the proportionate share of the settling party;
(5) To allow any offset for compensation benefits to inure to the benefit of all defendants,
and otherwise to treat a Mandolidls defendant in like manner as any other defendant.
Stoneking, supra note 1, at 189-90.
7 At the time he wrote this Article, Mr. Stoneking was an associate of the Charleston, West Virginia
firm of Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell.
I See infra discussion at notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
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wanton, or reckless behavior.9 This rule conflicts with the fairness and efficiency criteria underlying loss allocation, which require that all wrongdoers bear
their proportionate share of the plaintiff's damages. Accordingly, contribution
should be made available among all joint tortfeasors, including those guilty of
aggravated misconduct.10
Second, as to victims, West Virginia's modified rule of comparative negligence denies all compensation to plaintiffs whose own negligence represents
fifty percent or more of the fault that proximately caused their damages. The
denial of all compensation to plaintiffs who are fifty percent or more "at
fault"" conflicts with the goal of proportionate loss allocation, and also is
inconsistent with the current West Virginia rule of pure comparative contribution among defendants.' 2 Fair and efficient loss allocation would best be
promoted by a rule of pure comparative negligence.
Part II of this Article explores the meaning of the goal of "loss allocation"
that underlies modern systems of comparative fault. This discussion of the
justice and efficiency aspects of loss allocation serves as a foundation for the
analysis in parts III and IV.
Part III analyzes the rules governing contribution among tortfeasors, including the effect of a settlement by one of several tortfeasors and the availability of contribution to tortfeasors guilty of aggravated misconduct. Mr.
Stoneking's proposals are criticized, and alternative proposals are advanced,
based primarily on the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. 3
Part IV compares the rules of pure and modified comparative negligence
with respect to the fairness and efficiency criteria embodied in the goal of loss
allocation. The author concludes that pure comparative fault is more just and
more efficient, advocating adoption of the pure comparative fault system represented by the UCFA.
II.

Loss

ALLOCATION UNDER COMPARATIvE FAULT

Tort law serves a variety of purposes. It compensates victims, imposes the
cost of compensation on wrongdoers, punishes misconduct, deters future mis-

9 E.g., Buskirk v. Sanders, 70 W. Va. 363, 370, 73 S.E. 937, 940 (1912); Hutcherson v. Slate,
105 W. Va. 184, 190, 142 S.E. 444, 447 (1928).
,WMr. Stoneking advocates that contribution be available to defendants guilty of reckless, willful,
or wanton misconduct, but not to intentional tortfeasors.
11The phrase "x% at fault" will hereinafter be used as shorthand for the concept that the party's
causal negligence (or other wrongful behavior embodied in the term "fault") represented x% of the
total fault that contributed to the plaintiff's injuries.
12 Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 169 W. Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 679 (1982)(discussed infra
note 65, at 108-11 and accompanying text).
,3 Unp. Co iPARATIvE FAULT AcT (1977)(amended 1979), 12 U.L.A. 38-63 (Supp. 1987) (UCFA).
The text of the UCFA is reprinted in the Appendix to this Article.
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conduct, and reinforces codes of social behavior. Modern approaches to tort
law have emphasized two often-conflicting goals: corrective justice and economic efficiency. 14 Corrective justice comprises two subsidiary principles: the
"compensation principle" that a victim should receive compensation for injuries inflicted by others, and the "apportionment principle" that a wrongdoer

should pay for damages caused by his misconduct.'s Advocates of corrective
justice consider in moral terms whether the plaintiff "deserves" compensation
and whether this compensation "ought" to be paid by the defendant., 6 Pro-17
ponents of economic efficiency seek to maximize the value of social resources.
They analyze the impact of legal rules on the incentives of the parties to engage

in efficient behavior' and on the efficiency of resource allocation among various activities.' 9
The comparative fault system reflects considerations of both justice and
efficiency. These twin pillars of modern American tort law are united within
the broader concept of "loss allocation. ' 20 Comparative fault involves "loss
allocation" in a corrective justice sense in that it purports to distribute the
losses in proportion to the wrongdoing of the parties. 2'

14 See Englard, The System Builders: A CriticalAppraisal of Modern Tort Theory, 9 J. LEGAL.
STUD. 27 (1980).
See Note, ComparativeNegligence, 81 CoLuM. L. Rzv. 1668 (1981).
16 Englard, supra note 14, at 27, 57-68. See, e.g., Fletcher, Fairnessand Utility in Tort Theory,
85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J.LEGAL SWtD. 151 (1973);
Epstein, Defenses and Subsequent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J.LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974).
Cf. Robertson v. LeMaster, 301 S.E.2d 563, 567 (W.Va. 1983) (quoting Blaine v. Chesapeake & O.R.R.
Co., 9 W. Va. 252 (1876) (Syl. pt. 8)): "The liability to make reparation for an injury, by negligence,
is founded upon an original moral duty, enjoined upon every person, so to conduct himself, or exercise
his own rights, as not to injur [sici another."
17Efficiency has various meanings in different contexts and to different authors. See Lewin, Compensated Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IowA L. REv. 775 n.5 (1986). Most commonly the term is used synonymously with "Kaldor-Hicks efficiency" or "wealth maximization." See,
e.g., R. PosNER, ECONoMc ANALYsis OF LAw 12 (3d ed. 1986) ("efficiency.. .denote[s] that allocation
of resources in which value is maximized"); A.M. PoLNsKcY, AN INTRODUcTON TO LAW AND EcoNoMncs
7 (1983)("efficiency corresponds to 'the size of the pie"').
,8Englard, supra note 14, at 32-56. See generally, e.g., G. CALABRFmS,
THE Cosr oF Accma.NTs:
A LEGAL AND Ecoomc ANALYsis (1970); Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961) [hereinafter cited as Some Thoughts]; R. PosrER, supra note 17, at
147-199; A. M. PomcsKy, supra note 17, at 37-49, 95-104. The effect of legal rules on incentives is
discussed in greater detail infra in Part IV.B.I.
'1 See generally, e.g., Some Thoughts, supra note 18; R. POSNER, supra note 17; A.M. PoLNsKY,
supra note 17. The effect of legal rules on resource allocation is discussed in greater detail infra in Parts
III.B., III.C., and IV.B.2.
- The term "loss allocation" was suggested to me by Mr. Stoneking's statements that the purpose
of our modem tort system is "to allocate loss." See Stoneking, supra note 1, at 178, 179. The content
of the term derives from Calabresi's discussion of the related term "risk distribution." See Some Thoughts,
supra note 18. Other authors refer variously to risk allocation or loss distribution. The term loss allocation
seems to best capture the full range of concepts underlying comparative fault.

21

See Note, supra note 15, at 1670.
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The allocation of loss through comparative fault also promotes economic
efficiency. By imposing a portion of the losses on each wrongdoer, all parties
have an incentive to exercise due care. 22 Comparative fault further promotes
efficiency by "internalizing" a portion of the damages to each of the responsible parties, so that each party considers the damages it causes as a cost of
its activity. In the absence of such cost internalization, damaging activities, in
effect, would be subsidized, resulting in an excess level of damaging behavior. 23
Loss allocation may also be efficient to the extent it minimizes the personal
and economic dislocations that 24might otherwise result if a single party were
required to bear the entire loss.
recognizes that the purpose of comparative fault is "to allocate
Stoneking
' He
loss. ' 1s
does not, however, explore the justice and efficiency concerns which
underlie this deceptively simple concept. More importantly, he does not consider
the implications of loss allocation for the overall structure of the comparative
fault system.
The next two sections apply the goal of loss allocation to the two main
structural components of the comparative fault system: the rules governing
contribution among tortfeasors, and the choice between pure and modified
comparative fault.
III.

RuLEs GOVERNING CONTRIBUTION AMONG

TORTFBASORS

At common law, the remedy of contribution was not available to tortfeasors. The policy of Anglo-American law was to deny assistance to tortfeasors
because they were wrongdoers and not worthy of the court's assistance. 26 A
related rationale for this rule was the notion that the injured person was the
"lord of his action" and could place the loss where he saw fit.2 7
The common law rule against contribution among tortfeasors gradually
eroded with statutory and judicial adoption of contribution in a number of
states. In 1939, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State

See Haddock & Curran, An Economic Theory of Comparative Negligence, 14 J. LEGAL STUD.

49 (1985).
23

See A. M. PouiNsK,

supra note 18, at 500-03, discussing the "allocation of resources justifi-

cation" for imposing the costs of an activity on the enterprise generating those costs, even in the absence
of fault.
24 See Some Thoughts, supra note 18, at 517-27, discussing the "spreading of losses justification"
for imposing enterprise liability in the absence of fault.
25 Stoneking, supra note 1, at 178-79.
16

RESTATmE

(SEcoND) or ToRTs § 886A comment a; Commissioners' Prefatory Note to 1939

Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, 12 U.L.A. 60 (1975) (Commissioners' Prefatory Note).

This same policy had served as the basis for the rule of contributory negligence which barred any damage
action by a wrongdoing plaintiff.
2 Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 12 U.L.A. 60.
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Laws (hereinafter the "Commissioners") approved the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act, 28 which provided that a joint tortfeasor was entitled
to contribution if he "paid more than his pro rata share" of a common liability. 29 Although eight states adopted the 1939 UCATA, most of them made
important changes in the Act.3 0 The 1939 UCATA was withdrawn, 31 and in
32
1955 the Commissioners approved a substantially revised version of the Act.
The 1955 UCATA changed the rules governing the effect of a settlement with
one of two or more joint tortfeasors, but it continued to provide a right of
contribution "in .favor of a tortfeasor
who has paid more than his pro rata
33
share of the common liability."
The provision for "pro rata" contribution in both the 1939 and 1955 UCATA
meant that damages would be apportioned among the defendants on a per
capita basis. When there were two wrongdoers, each would pay fifty percent;
when there were five, each would pay twenty percent. The 1955 UCATA expressly provided that in determining the tortfeasors'
pro rata shares, "their
34
relative degrees of fault shall not be considered.
The rule of pro rata contribution among defendants under the UCATA
was inconsistent with the emerging rules of comparative negligence under which
liability was apportioned on the basis of relative fault. The Commissioners were
aware of this inconsistency. Accordingly, after two-thirds of the states had
adopted comparative negligence, the Commissioners in 1977 enacted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. 35 The UCFA expressly was intended to replace
the 1955 UCATA in states adopting systems of comparative fault.3 6 Under the

2

UNIF. CoNInu-BnoN AMONG ToRTFEAso s ACT (1939), U.L.A. 57-59 (1975) (1939 UCATA). The

1939 UCATA was revised in 1955 (1955 UCATA).
1939 UCATA, § 2, 12 U.L.A. at 57.
1955 UCATA, Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 12 U.L.A. 59.
31 Id.
32 1955 UCATA, 12 U.L.A. 63-107.
33 Id. at § 1, 12 U.L.A. at 63.
Id. at § 2, 12 U.L.A. at 87. The 1955 UCATA also eliminated an optional provision in the
1939 UCATA which had authorized consideration of relative degrees of fault "[w]hen there is such a
disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to render inequitable an equal distribution among
them." 1939 UCATA , § 2(4), 12 U.L.A. at 57.
35 UCFA, 12 U.L.A. at 39 (Supp. 1987).
6 The Prefatory Note to the UCFA states:
The NCCUSL has promulgated two uniform contribution Acts-the first in 1939,
superseded by a revised act in 1955. Both of these Acts provide for pro rata contribution,
which may be suitable in a state not applying the principle of comparative fault, but is inappropriate in a comparative-fault state apportioning ultimate responsibility on the basis of
the proportionate fault of the parties involved.
It has therefore been decided not to amend the separate Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, 1955, but to leave that Act for possible use by states not adopting the principle
of comparative fault. Instead, the present Act contains appropriate sections covering the rights
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UCFA, the "basis for contribution is each person's equitable share of the obligation," the equitable share being based on the person's proportionate degree
of fault." As will be demonstrated in the discussion which follows, the provisions of the UCFA provide an appropriate solution to the various issues of
contribution among defendants under a system of comparative fault.
A.

Effect of Settlement by One of Several Tortfeasors

Among the most difficult issues raised by multi-party litigation is the problem of settlement by the plaintiff with less than all of the defendants. 8 The
1939 UCATA provided that in the event of a settlement, a plaintiff's claim
would be reduced by the amount of consideration paid for the release, 39 but
a settling tortfeasor would not be relieved of liability for contribution to codefendants.4 0 Without protection against claims for contribution, individual
defendants generally were unwilling to settle. 41 As a result of the complaints
about this disincentive to settlement, 42 the revised 1955 UCATA provided that
a release discharged a settling party from all liability for contribution to any

existing between the parties who are jointly and severally liable in tort. The 1955 Act should
be replaced by this Act in any state that adopts the comparative fault principle, and would
be eventually replaced.
12 U.L.A. 39 (Supp. 1987). See also id. § 4 (comment), at 45.
- UCFA, §§ 2, 4, 12 U.L.A. 41-42, 45 (Supp. 1987).
11See, e.g., Pearson, Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of
the Alternatives, 40 LA. L. REv. 343, 369-71 (1980); Wade, A Uniform ComparativeFault Act-What
Should It Provide?, 10 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 220, 232, 234 (1977); Note, The Modification of Joint and
Several Liability: Considerationof the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 36 U. FLA. L. REv. 288, 30709 (1984).
39 1939 UCATA, § 4, 12 U.L.A. at 57.
§ 4. Release; Effect on Injured Person's Claim.-A release by the injured person of one joint
tortfeasor, whether before or after judgment, does not discharge the other tortfeasors unless
the release so provides; but reduces the claim against the other tortfeasors in the amount of
the consideration paid for the release, or in any amount or proportion by which the release
provides that the total claim shall be reduced, if greater than the consideration paid.
,0 Id. at § 5, 12 U.L.A. at 58.
§ 5. Release; Effect on Right of Contribution.-A release by the injured person of one joint
tortfeasor does not relieve him from liability to make contribution to another joint tortfeasor
unless the release is given before the right of the other tortfeasor to secure a money judgment
for contribution has accrued, and provides for a reduction, to the extent of the pro rata share
of the released tortfeasor, of the injured person's damages recoverable against all the other
tortfeasors.
"1 1955 UCATA, § 4(b)(comment), 12 U.L.A. at 99-100. Under the 1939 UCFA, a settling defendant would only be relieved of liability for contribution if the release provided for reduction of the
plaintiff's claim against non-settling tortfeasors to the extent of the pro rata share of the settling defendant. 1939 UCATA, § 5, 12 U.L.A. at 58. Plaintiffs' attorneys were unwilling to give such releases
because of the uncertainty as to what they would be giving up. 1955 UCATA, § 4(b) (comment), 12
U.L.A. at 99. See also Pearson, supra note 38, at 370.
42 See 1955 UCATA, § 4 (comment), 12 U.L.A. at 99-100.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 4 [1987], Art. 12
1046

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

other tortfeasor, while continuing to provide that a release would reduce the
claim of the plaintiff by the amount of consideration paid for that release. 43
To illustrate, suppose that A sustained damages of $100,000 as a result of
the negligence of B and C. In the absence of a settlement, each would contribute
$50,000 to the satisfaction of A's judgment according to the "pro rata" provisions of the Act. But, if A settled with B for $10,000, his remaining claim
against C would be reduced to $90,000. Under the 1939 UCATA, C could then
obtain $40,000 in contribution from B, so that each would pay a total of $50,000.
B would gain nothing from the settlement, and C would not be prejudiced.
Under the 1955 UCATA, however, B would be discharged from liability for
contribution to C, so that B's net payment would be $10,000, and C's net
payment would be $90,000. A low settlement by one tortfeasor under the 1955
UCATA could substantially increase the potential liability of nonsettling tortfeasors. The 1955 revision thus greatly increased the risk of collusively
low
44
settlements between the plaintiff and one or more of the defendants.
The contribution provisions of the 1955 UCATA were inconsistent with
comparative fault because they provided for apportionment of contribution on
a pro rata basis without regard to the parties' relative degrees of fault. Even
if the contribution provisions of the 1955 UCATA had been amended appropriately, however, the provisions governing the effect of settlement by one of
the tortfeasors would still have been incompatible with comparative fault.
In particular, the problem of collusive settlements would have been exacerbated if the settlement and release provisions of the 1955 UCATA were
applied in a system of comparative negligence and comparative contribution.
Suppose, in the above example, that B was seventy percent at fault and C was
thirty percent at fault in causing damages of $100,000 to A. In the absence of

43 Id.

at § 4, 12 U.L.A. at 98:

§ 4. [Release or Covenant Not to Sue]
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce judgment is given in good
faith to one of two or more persons liable in tort for the same injury or the same wrongful

death:
(a) It does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury or
wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but it reduces the claim against the others to the

extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the
consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater; and,

(b) It discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all liability for contribution to
any other tortfeasor.
" See Pearson, supra note 38, at 370; Note, supra note 38, at 307-08. The primary protection
against collusion was the requirement in section 4 of the 1955 UCATA that the release had been "given
in good faith." It is doubtful whether this provision gave meaningful protection against collusive setflements. Given the uncertainties of litigation, it would be quite difficult to establish that a release was
given in bad faith, even if the consideration were very low in relation to the amount of the plaintiff's
damages. Id.
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a settlement, and with comparative contribution, B would pay $70,000 and C
would pay $30,000. But if A settled with B for $10,000, application of the
settlement provisions of the 1955 UCATA would leave C liable for the remaining $90,000. Thus, if the settlement provisions of the UCATA were applied
in a system of comparative contribution, the tortfeasor whose fault was greater
would have even more to gain from a collusively low settlement, while the
tortfeasor less at fault would suffer considerable prejudice.
The Commissioners recognized that the contribution, settlement, and release provisions of the 1955 UCATA were inconsistent with principles of comparative negligence. 4 Accordingly, when they adopted the UCFA they included
separate contribution, settlement, and release provisions for comparative negligence states. 46 Under the UCFA, a settlement with one of several joint tortfeasors discharges the released tortfeasor from liability and reduces the claim
of the plaintiff against the remaining defendants "by the amount of the released
person's equitable share of the obligation. ' 47 This, provision eliminates the incentive for the plaintiff to enter into a collusively low settlement with one
defendant, and it fully protects the nonsettling defendants from being prejudiced by such a settlement.
To illustrate, consider again the foregoing example in which B was seventy
percent at fault and C was thirty percent at fault for the plaintiff's damages
of $100,000. With comparative contribution under the UCFA, and in the absence of a settlement, B would pay $70,000 toward A's judgment, and C would
pay $30,000. Under the settlement and release provisions of the UCFA, however, any settlement between A and B would reduce A's claim against C by
seventy percent, to $30,000. The result would be the same irrespective of whether
A settled with B for $10,000, $40,000, or $80,000. Regardless of the amount
paid in settlement by B, C would be liable only for his thirty percent equitable
proportionate share of the judgment. A would have no incentive to enter into
a collusively low settlement with B, since A's claim against C would be reduced
by seventy percent regardless of the consideration paid by B. On the other
hand, C could not be prejudiced if A settled with B for $10,000, or even $10,
since C would be liable for only thirty percent of the judgment in any event.
The settlement and release provisions of the UCFA thus effectively eliminate
48
the problem of collusive settlements.

41See

supra note 36.
- Id. See UCFA, §§ 4, 5, 6, 12 U.L.A. at 45-47 (Supp. 1987) (reprinted infra in Appendix).
-"UCFA § 6, 12 U.L.A. 47 (Supp. 1987) (reprinted infra in Appendix).
43 The simple proportionate reduction of the plaintiff's claim would not have been an appropriate
solution to the problem of collusive settlements in the absence of comparative contribution. In a system
of per capita pro rata contribution, proportionate reduction would have deterred plaintiffs from settling
with precisely those defendants against whom their claims were weakest. For example, suppose A had
a weak case against B and a strong case against C. In the absence of comparative fault, A would
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Stoneking follows the UCFA in his recommendation that a settling tortfeasor should be discharged from liability for contribution to other tortfea49
sors,
but he then rejects the UCFA's provision for proportionate reduction
of the plaintiff's claim against the nonsettling tortfeasors. Instead, he recommends adoption of a New York statute which provides that a settlement
reduces the plaintiffs claim against nonsettling tortfeasors by the greater of:
(1) the amount of the consideration paid for the release, or (2) the proportionate
share of the settling defendant.5 0 Applying the New York approach to the above

example, a settlement by A with B for $10,000 would reduce A's claim against
C by $70,000 (the greater of $10,000 and seventy percent of $100,000), to

$30,000. If A settled with B for $85,000, A's claim against C would be reduced
by $85,000 (the greater of $85,000 and seventy percent of $100,000), to $15,000.
The New York rule represents a controversial solution to the problem of
collusive settlements .5 Within a system of comparative fault, the New York
approach is both unnecessary and inappropriate. It is unnecessary because the
problem of collusive settlements can be eliminated by the simple proportionate

anticipate either a recovery of 100% from C or 50% each from B and C. Thus, if settlement produced
a per capita reduction of plaintiff's claim against nonsettling defendants, any settlement with B could
reduce A's claim against C by 50% if the jury found both B and C to be liable. Unless A were confident
that B would be exonerated from liability at trial, A would be reluctant to settle with B for an amount
substantially less than 50% of the amount of the expected judgment, discounted by the possibility of
recovering nothing at trial.
A would not confront such a risk under comparative fault because, by hypothesis, the case against
B was relatively weak, so B's proportionate share of fault and the corresponding reduction of the
plaintiff's claim against C would be relatively low, perhaps 10% or 20%. With the risk of only a 10%
or 20% reduction in the claim against C, it would be reasonable for A to accept a correspondingly low
settlement offer from B.
,9 Stoneking, supra note 1, at 179-81.

Id. at 184-87. N.Y. Gen. Oblig. Law § 15-108 (McKinney 1978) provides:
When a release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is given to one of
two or more persons liable or claimed to be liable in tort for the same injury, or the same
wrongful death, it does not discharge any of the other tortfeasors from liability for the injury
or wrongful death unless its terms expressly so provide, but it reduces the claim of the releasor
against the other tortfeasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the
covenant, or in the amount of the consideration paid for it, or in the amount of the released
tortfeasor's equitable share of the damages under article fourteen of the civil practice law and
rules, whichever is the greatest.
Pennsylvania has a similar statute, 42 PA. C.S. § 8326. But see Charles v. Giant Eagle Mkts., No.
J-156-1986 (Pa. Super Ct. Feb. 20, 1987), holding that when the consideration paid for the settlement
exceeded the proportionate share of the settling defendant, but the release expressly provided that the
recovery against the nonsettling defendant would be reduced to the extent of the settling defendant's
pro rata share, the plaintiff's recovery would only be reduced by the settling defendant's proportionate
share notwithstanding the statutory mandate that the recovery be reduced by the amount of consideration
paid for the release when it exceeded that proportionate share.
1, See Comment, Repealing New York's Post-Settlement Equitable Share Reduction Scheme: An
Idea Whose Time Has Come, 49 ALBANY L. REv. 856 (1985).
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reduction of the plaintiff's claim by a percentage equal to the share of the
settling tortfeasor. 2 It is inappropriate because, as explained below, it would
unfairly reduce the recovery by plaintiffs, interfere with loss allocation, and
impede the settlement process.
Stoneking's proposal reflects only a partial understanding of the foregoing
historical development. He correctly recognizes the inappropriateness, under a
system of comparative fault, of the 1955 UCATA's reduction of the plaintiff's
claim against other defendants by the dollar amount of the consideration received for the release.5 3 Yet his argument against the UCFA approach and in
favor of the New York approach is unconvincing.
Stoneking's rationale for rejecting the simple proportionate reduction of a
plaintiff's claim is that "[tihe possibility of either under- or over-compensation
of the plaintiff is too great [because]... the only time a plaintiff will receive
the amount fixed as damages by the jury is when the proportionate share of
the settling defendant is equal to the settlement amount. ' 5 4 While his factual
premise obviously is true, Stoneking does not explain why this presents more
of a problem here than in the case of a plaintiff who settles with a single
defendant in a typical lawsuit. In either case, the plaintiff agrees to accept less

Fear of collusion between the plaintiff and one of the joint tortfeasors had been a persistent
concern among both commentators and practitioners. The 1939 UCATA contained no standard limiting
enforceability of settlements because the Act was drafted to prevent a release of one party from prejudicing the other defendants. The 1955 UCATA, however, allowed a settlement to operate as a complete
discharge of the released party, thereby opening the door for collusion. That Act provided that a release
only operates as a discharge if it "is given in good faith." 1955 UCATA, § 4, 12 U.L.A. at 98. See
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
The UCFA, however, imposes no such limitation on the effectiveness of releases. Although the
comments are a bit vague on this point, it is apparent that the concern about collusion simply does not
exist under the UCFA. The risk of collusively low settlements was eliminated by having the settlement
reduce the plaintiff's claim against the remaining defendants in proportion to the fault of the settling
defendant, rather than by the dollar amount of the settlement. See supra notes 45-48 and accompanying
text.
Curiously, Stoneking devotes substantial attention to the problem of collusion and the associated
issue of the standard for enforceability of settlement agreements. See Stoneking, supra note 1, at 181.
He is misled into doing so by two mistakes. First, he bases much of his analysis on the 1955 UCATA,
which is inappropriate in comparative negligence jurisdictions. See id. at 182-83 nn.96, 97, 104. Second,
he considers the standard of enforceability prior to his consideration of the consequences of a settlement
and release. Thus, his discussion of the problem of collusion fails to reflect that any nonsettling defendants would be protected through the resulting reduction of the plaintiff's claim by at least the proportionate share of the settling tortfeasor.
Although I have no quarrel with Stoneking's suggestion that settlement agreements should be enforceable in the absence of collusion, collusion is simply not a problem under either the UCFA or
Stoneking's alternative proposal. There is thus no need to add an "absence of collusion" standard to
any legislative revision of the rules governing comparative contribution.
11Id. at 185.
Id. at 185-86.
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than the expected value of the lawsuit in return for the elimination of the cost,
delay, risk, and uncertainty of litigation."
Stoneking concedes that pure proportionate reduction would allow the
plaintiff a fair gamble, but he complains that this "elevates risk taking to the
level of a goal which the system encourages ...[whereas] the primary goal should
be to fairly compensate the plaintiff for the loss."6 Stoneking does not explain,
however, how the New York approach would advance the goal of fair compensation. In fact, the New York approach virtually assures that the plaintiff
will be undercompensated.
Let us once again consider the hypothetical in which a jury would eventually
find that A sustained $100,000 in damages due to the negligence of B and C,
who were seventy percent and thirty percent at fault, respectively. Under Stoneking's proposal, if A settled with B for any amount less than $70,000, A
would retain only a $30,000 claim against C, so that A's total recovery would
be less than $100,000. To be sure, if A settled with B for $70,000, A's claim
against C would be reduced to $30,000, and A would recover exactly $100,000.
And if A settled with B for an amount greater than $70,000, say $85,000, A's
claim against C would be reduced to $15,000, so that his total recovery would
again be $100,000.
But how likely is it that B would offer in settlement an amount greater
than or equal to its expected share of the judgment? Typically, a defendant
offers less than its expected share of the judgment, anticipating that the plaintiff
will settle for less in order to avoid litigation. Under Stoneking's proposal, A
would only recover the full amount of the court-awarded damages in cases in
which the settling defendant was completely exonerated or in those rare cases
in which the consideration for the settlement exceeded the settling defendant's
proportionate share. In the vast majority of disputes, however, A would accept
in settlement an amount less than B's actual proportionate share of the damages, in which case A's total recovery would be less than the amount awarded
by the jury. Consequently, Stoneking would convert an essentially fair gamble
into a game in which the odds favor the defendant: the plaintiff can at best
break even and usually receives less than the amount awarded in damages by
the jury. The net result of Stoneking's proposal would be to reduce the damages
recovered by settling plaintiffs and ultimately to deter plaintiffs from settling."

" See R. PosNER, supra note 17, at 522-28; Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow
of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 966-77 (1979).
6 Stoneking, supra note 1, at 186. Stoneking might be less concerned about overcompensation if
he viewed any excess payment by a settling defendant as though it were a payment by a collateral source.
But, being a member of the defense bar, he is not overly sympathetic to the collateral source rule. See
infra notes 87-91 and accompanying text.
See Comment, supra note 51, at 858-66.
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In conclusion, Mr. Stoneking's proposal to follow the New York approach
of reducing a settling plaintiff's claim by the greater of the proportionate share
of the released party or the dollar amount of consideration paid for the release
would be unfair to plaintiffs and contrary to the goal of judicial economy. A
rule of equitable proportionate reduction was enacted as part of the UCFA
and has the support of many prominent scholars. 5 s There is simply no reason
to depart from this sensible and fair approach to the issue of verdict reduction
under comparative contribution.
B.

Contribution and Aggravated Misconduct

With the rejection of the rule against contribution among tortfeasors, it
first appeared that all tortfeasors might be entitled to seek contribution, regardless of the degree of their wrongdoing. The 1939 UCATA was silent on
the question of contribution for tortfeasors guilty of aggravated misconduct.
An optional provision of the 1939 UCATA authorized consideration of the
relative degrees of fault in determining the pro rata shares of joint tortfeasors
when "there is such a disproportion of fault among joint tortfeasors as to
render inequitable an equal distribution among them," 59 but it did not indicate
that the more serious wrongdoers would be barred from contribution. The 1955
UCATA, however, expressly denied any right of contribution to tortfeasors
whose conduct was intentional, willful, or wanton. 0 It also eliminated the provision regarding disproportionate fault, providing instead that "[the defendants'] relative degrees of fault shall not be considered." 61 The Commissioners
conceded that the denial of contribution to tortfeasors guilty of aggravated
misconduct was based on the same policy as the traditional rule barring all
contribution among tortfeasors, simply narrowing the scope of the bar from
"all wrongdoers" to "wrongdoers guilty of moral turpitude." 62

2 Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the CaliforniaLegislature on Tort Liability on the
ProblemsAssociated with American Motorcycle Association v. Superior Court, 30 HASTiNGS L.J. 1465,
1485-87 (1979); Wade, supra note 38, at 234; Note, supra note 15, at 1695-96. It also is deemed appropriate by one member of West Virginia's defense bar. See Emch, Comparative Negligence in West
Virginia: A Defense Overview, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 493, 511-15 (1980).
1939 UCATA § 2(4), 12 U.L.A. at 57.
1955 UCATA § I(c), 12 U.L.A. at 63. The comment to this subsection states that the words
"wilfully or wantonly" are optional and may be omitted in states where "they mean something less
than they imply and where by including them the bar of the remedy would be too broad." Id. (comment),
12 U.L.A. at 65.
6 Id. at § 2, 12 U.L.A. at 87.
The Commissioners explained:
The substance of this provision is found in a few of the existing statutes, usually in
rather vague language. Kentucky and Virginia, for example, provide that there must be no
"moral turpitude." The 1939 Act was silent on the matter. The policy here followed is that
of the original rule as to contribution, that the court will not aid an intentional wrongdoer
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Stoneking correctly perceives that loss allocation requires the availability
of contribution for defendants guilty of aggravated misconduct. He asserts,

without further explanation, that if they were barred from contribution, "the
policy of allocating loss would be sacrificed." 63 Yet it is not self-evident that
barring contribution claims by tortfeasors guilty of aggravated misconduct is
inconsistent with loss allocation. Leaving the entire loss to bear on serious

wrongdoers appears superficially to be consistent with principles of corrective
justice and with the efficiency-oriented goal of deterrence.
Denial of contribution for aggravated misconduct is inconsistent with loss

allocation, however, insofar as it focuses entirely on punishment of the worst
wrongdoer and fails to force other tortfeasors to pay in proportion to their

fault. The noncontributing tortfeasors do not pay what they "ought" in fairness
to pay. 64 They are relieved from liability by the fortuitous circumstance that

their co-defendant is guilty of aggravated misconduct.
In Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight,Inc.,65 the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals adopted a rule of pure comparative contribution, holding that a

party who was seventy percent at fault could seek contribution from a party
who was only thirty percent at fault. Under Sitzes, a tortfeasor who was only
thirty percent or ten percent or even one percent at fault is liable to pay that
share of the plaintiff's damages to the tortfeasor who was seventy percent or

ninety percent or ninety-nine percent at fault. Applying Sitzes to the hypothetical in which the negligence of B and C contributed to A's injuries, B could

obtain contribution from C regardless of whether B's share of fault was seventy,
ninety, or even ninety-nine percent, provided that both parties were merely
"negligent." If B's conduct crossed the line from gross negligence to recklessness, however, then B's claim for contribution would be barred, and C
would be free from liability for the plaintiff's injuries.

in a cause of action which is founded on his own wrong. In cases of concerted battery, for
example, there appears to be little reason to shift any part of the liability to another.
Two valid reasons exist for extending the exclusion to wilful and wanton acts causing
or contributing to the injury.
In the first place wilful and wanton acts seem naturally to belong in the same class with
intentional wrongs and to imply moral turpitude on the part of the wrongdoer. The policy
of the section as drafted adopts the law of those states which do not recognize classification
of negligence into degrees. It is intended to convey the idea that there is a difference between
negligence and wilful or wanton misconduct. (See Srajer v. Schwartzman, 164 Kan. 1, c. 248)
In the second place, by excluding wilful and wanton actors from the right to contribution,
we eliminate most of the arguments urged for a rule allocating the thares of liability on the
basis of relative degrees of fault. (See Sec. 2.)
Id. at § 1(c) (comment), 12 U.L.A. at 65.
63 Stoneking, supra note 1, at 178. See generally id. at 176-179.
See Southern Pacific Transp. Co. v. State, 115 Cal. App. 3d 116, 171 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1981).
Sitzes, 169 W. Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 679.
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The unfairness of the rule denying contribution for aggravated misconduct
is exacerbated by the arbitrariness of the dividing line. Courts and commentators have struggled in vain to articulate a distinction between reckless misconduct, for which punitive damages may be awarded, and simple or gross
negligence, for which punitive damages generally are not warranted. 66 It would
be even more unfair if liability for compensatory damages were to turn on this
fine distinction.
The arbitrariness of the rule denying contribution to tortfeasors guilty of
aggravated misconduct is further compounded by the fact that A has the option
of proceeding against either B or C for satisfaction of the judgment. If A
obtained satisfaction from C, the less serious wrongdoer, C would then be able
to seek contribution from B. But if A instead sought satisfaction from B, who
was guilty of aggravated misconduct, B would be barred from seeking contribution, and C would escape liability completely.
Denial of contribution for aggravated misconduct is inefficient as well as
unfair. To the extent that certain tortfeasors do not pay their proportionate
share of the plaintiff's damages, they do not bear an appropriate share of the
economic costs generated by their activities, while others pay more than their
appropriate share. Tortfeasors guilty of aggravated misconduct bear a disproportionate share of the damages and suffer unduly reduced profits, thereby
subsidizing their potential co-defendants who obtain artificially enhanced profits by virtue of their immunity from contribution claims. The difference in
profitability would result, in the long run, in an inefficient allocation of resources, with too few resources invested in the activities that are barred from
contribution and too many resources in the activities that benefit from the rule
against contribution.6
Allocative inefficiency would not be a problem in the absence of a systematic tendency for certain activities to benefit or suffer from the rule against
contribution for aggravated misconduct. If the gains and losses could be expected to offset each other in the long run, then the rule would not lead to
inefficient resource allocation. Unfortunately, however, application of the tra-

6 See Lewin, The Tail Wags the Dog: JudicialMisinterpretationof the Punitive Damages Ban in
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 27 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 245, 266 (1986); Note, Comparative Fault and
Intentional Torts, 12 Loyola L.A. L. Rev. 179, 189-90 (1978); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TiE LAw
OF TORTS 9-10 (4th ed. 1971); Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 Cm.[-]Km=r L. Rev.
(pt.1) 189, 203-04 (1950); C. McCoEmcK, HANDBOOK ON mE LAW OF DAmAGEs 280-82 (1935); 25 C.J.S.
Damages § 123(8) (1966); 17 C.J. Damages § 284 (1919). Cf. Cline v. Joy Mfg. Co., 310 S.E.2d 835
(W. Va. 1983) (reversing jury verdict in Mandolidis action due to insufficient evidence as to willful,
wanton, or reckless misconduct). Moreover, in a minority of jurisdictions gross negligence is a sufficient
basis for the award of punitive damages. E.g., Pedernales Elec. Coop., Inc. v. Schulz, 583 S.W.2d 882
(Tex. Civ. App. 1979).
6 Cf. A.M. POuNsKY, supra note 17, at 44-48; Some Thoughts, supra note 18, at 502-03.
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ditional rule in Mandolidis actions now systematically tends to harm West Virginia employers who are barred from seeking contribution, while benefiting
out-of-state manufacturers who escape their proportionate share of liability
whenever the plaintiff proceeds against the employer to satisfy the judgment.
The traditional rule also impedes the "loss spreading" function of comparative
fault by placing a disproportionate share of the burden from industrial accidents
on employers, who may not be able to absorb these costs without cutbacks
and layoffs, instead of spreading the loss to other tortfeasors. For these reasons, economic efficiency requires the availability of contribution for all
defendants, even those guilty of aggravated misconduct.
To the extent that punishment of serious wrongdoers remains a goal of the
tort system, that purpose can be fully accomplished under the rules of comparative fault, complemented by the existing remedy of punitive damages. Insofar as aggravated misconduct represents more serious wrongdoing, we can
rely on the jury to apportion fault accordingly and to place an appropriate
share of the cost on the tortfeasor guilty of aggravated misconduct. 68 In addition, punitive damages may be awarded against a defendant in cases of intentional, willful, wanton, or reckless misconduct for the purposes of punishing
69
the defendant and deterring similar misconduct by the defendant and others.
Punitive damages are awarded individually as to each defendant guilty of aggravated misconduct, and should not be subject to contribution." Thus, to the
extent that retribution is an appropriate consideration in a particular case,7
that purpose can be satisfied by an award of punitive damages without undermining the loss allocation function of comparative contribution.

61 See Note, supra note 15, at 1694. As Stoneking aptly states: "The theme which runs throughout
the case law is a willingness to rely upon the ability of jurors to apply common sense in assessing

damages and assigning fault among the parties." Stoneking, supra note 1, at 175. Cf. infra note 183.
But see Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 Mica. L. REv. 465, 475, 508 (1953) (expressing distrust
of juries in apportioning fault).
See Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 11-12 (W. Va. 1982); Wells v. Smith, 297 S.E.2d 872, 87677 (%V.Va. 1982). Hensley v. Erie Ins. Co., 168 W. Va. 172, 283 S.E.2d 227 (1981); Spencer v. Steinbrecher, 152 W. Va. 490, 164 S.E.2d 710 (1968); Mayer v. Frobe, 40 W. Va. 246, 22 S.E. 58 (1895);
BLACK's LAW DicnoNtAY 352 (5th ed. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTS § 908 and comments

a, b (1977); Lewin, supra note 66, at 249, n.16, 17. West Virginia recognizes that punitive damages
also serve to compensate plaintiffs for the infliction of egregious misconduct and to substitute for personal
revenge. Perry, 299 S.E.2d 8; Hensley, 168 NV. Va. 172, 283 S.E.2d 227.
See State v. Cook, 400 S.W.2d 38, 42 (Mo. 1966) (en banc); Note, supra note 15, at 1694-95.
Cf. Perry, 299 S.E.2d at 11 (reversing refusal of punitive damage instruction against one defendant but
affirming refusal of such instruction against the other defendant as to whom evidence did not support
a finding of aggravated misconduct).
7, The Mandolidis amendments provided that an employer would not be liable for punitive damages
when it intentionally exposed an employee to specific unsafe conditions but without any deliberate intention to produce injury. W. VA. CODE § 234-2(c)(2) (1985). If the legislature has determined that the
employer in such a case should not be punished with an award of punitive damages, it would seem
inappropriate to apply retributive principles to bar that employer's claim for contribution.
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Stoneking recognizes that loss allocation is promoted by the availability of
contribution for defendants guilty of aggravated misconduct, but he draws the
line at intentional acts, recommending against contribution for intentional tortfeasors. 72 His conclusion is curious since he claims to have rejected retribution
in favor of loss allocation,73 and he even notes that the exclusion of intentional74
torts from the UCFA was not based on any theoretical or principled objection.
Under the UCFA, contribution is available to tortfeasors whose conduct
is "negligent or reckless" or "subject ...

to strict tort liability." ' 75 Yet the

Act's omission of intentional conduct was based solely on the absence of precedent from other jurisdictions, and the Commissioners indicated that the Act
would not preclude a court from extending comparative fault to intentional
torts under common law principles. 76
Stoneking advances two possible reasons for denying contribution to intentional tortfeasors. First, he notes that such a rule reflects what is probably
the correct interpretation of Merryweather v. Nixan,77 the English decision from78
which the American rule against contribution among tortfeasors was derived.
He does not explain, however, why this old case should be resurrected as a
barrier to loss allocation in a comprehensive reform of the modern comparative
fault system.
Second, Stoneking claims that the legislature implicitly endorsed a distinction between intentional and other aggravated misconduct when it enacted
the Mandolidis amendments. 79 But those amendments simply extended liability
to employers in certain situations without proof of deliberate intention to produce injury. The creation of liability for a less-than-deliberate act does not
imply anything about the legislature's attitude towards deliberate wrongdoers,
whose liability under the pre-Mandolidis version of the statute remained unchanged in the post-Mandolidis amendments.
Moreover, it is simply not true, as Stoneking asserts, that the nature of
the misconduct defined in the statutory Mandolidis provisions "is no different

72

Stoneking, supra note 1, at 178-79, 189.
71 Malum in se harkens back to a day in which judges, like God, searched the hearts

of men.
The focus in the field of contribution is not on the alleged evil of the wrongful acts themselves.
The true goal of the system is to weigh fault and to allocate loss.

Id. at 178-79.
7, Id. at 178.
75 UCFA § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. at 38.
71 UCFA § 1 (comment), 12 U.L.A. at 39.

Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799).
Stoneking, supra note 1, at 171, 178.
79 W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2 (1985).
7
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from any other type of aggravated wrongdoing" or that it "is expressly distinguished from intentional wrongdoing." 80 To the contrary, statutory Mandolidis liability is based upon an intentional act: "expos[ing] an employee to
such specific unsafe working condition intentionally."81 Concededly, liability
under subsection (c)(2)(ii) does not require malice-"a consciously, subjectively
and deliberately formed intention to produce... injury" 8'-as does liability under subsection (c)(2)(i). Nevertheless, the legislature expressly stated that its
standard in subsection (c)(2)(ii) was "of more narrow application and contain[ed] more specific mandatory elements than the common law tort system
concept and standard of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct."' 3 It is therefore apparent that in subsection (c)(2)(ii) the legislature was distinguishing between two forms of intentional wrongdoing, and not between intentional and
nonintentional acts. 84 Ironically, a denial of contribution for intentional tortfeasors probably would preclude any claim for contribution by employers in
Mandolidis actions, a result directly contrary to the goal of Stoneking's proposal. Contribution should be made available even to intentional tortfeasors
for several reasons. First, as indicated above, the goal of loss allocation provides no basis for distinguishing between intentional and unintentional tortfeasors with respect to contribution. Both the corrective justice and economic
efficiercy aspects of loss allocation support comparative contribution among
all joint tortfeasors. Second, insofar as retribution remains a pertinent consideration, juries can be depended upon to allocate an appropriate share of
fault to intentional wrongdoers and to award substantial punitive damages.
Finally, any attempt to draw a line between intentional and unintentional
tortfeasors would necessarily promote uncertainty among the litigants. With
"recklessness" defined as the willful disregard of a known risk, the line between
intentional and unintentional conduct is difficult to draw. The disagreement
between Mr. Stoneking and this author as to whether employer liability for
intentionally exposing an employee to specific unsafe working conditions constitutes an intentional tort is typical of the controversies which undoubtedly
would arise in litigation. Such uncertainty would make settlement more difficult,85 resulting in additional administrative costs for the parties and for the
legal system.
In sum, Mr. Stoneking is correct in suggesting that contribution should be
available to tortfeasors guilty of aggravated misconduct. Consistent application
Stoneking, supra note 1, at 178.
W. VA. CODE § 23-4-2(c)(2)(ii)(D) (1985) (emphasis added).
Id. at § 23-4-2(c)(2)(i).
Id. at § 23-4-2(c)(1).
It is unclear why Stoneking misperceives this distinction. Perhaps his analysis was influenced by
the hope that his interpretation could influence the outcome of litigation for employers/clients seeking
contribution in Mandolidis actions under current law.
85 See Lewin, supra note 17, at 822. Cf. infra notes 141-44 and accompanying text.
"

83
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of the principle of loss allocation requires that contribution be available to all
joint tortfeasors, however, including intentional wrongdoers. A modern reformulation of our contribution rules could accomplish this result without any
sacrifice of the punitive and deterrent purposes of our tort law. It simply requires adoption of the UCFA, with an amendment adding "willful, wanton,
and intentional" conduct to the definition of fault. 6
C.

Workers' Compensation and Verdict Reduction

The statutory liability of an employer for injuries to an employee raises
special problems of contribution. When a plaintiff's injury is caused by the
employer and a third party, the liability of the employer differs from that of
its co-defendant in two respects. First, the employer necessarily will be liable
for aggravated misconduct, either deliberate infliction of injury or intentional
exposure of the employee to specific known risks, whereas the third party's
liability may be based on simple negligence or on strict liability for injuries
caused by a defective product. Second, while a third party may be liable for
the full amount of a plaintiff's injuries, the employer is only liable for the
excess of a plaintiff's 8damages
above the amount receivable under the workers'
7
compensation statute.
The conceptual distinctions among the legal standards of liability should
not cause any substantial problems with respect to comparative contribution.
In the field of product liability, for example, West Virginia and a majority of
the comparative negligence jurisdictions allow juries to compare the contributory negligence of consumers with the strict liability of manufacturers."8 Similarly, there is no reason why juries cannot compare the fault of the manufacturer

6 Section l(b) of the UCFA could be amended by adding the underlined language so that it would
read in pertinent part: .'Fault' includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent or reckless
or willful or wanton or intentionally injurioustoward the person or property of the actor or others, or
that subject a person to strict tort liability."
It should be noted that such an amendment also would apply between plaintiffs and defendants,
permitting a defendant guilty of aggravated misconduct to raise the plaintiff's comparative negligence
as a defense, thereby reducing the damages in proportion to the plaintiff's own negligence. Although
it is apparent that the goal of loss allocation applies with no less force to the issue of liability between
plaintiffs and defendants than it does to the issue of contribution among defendants, the issue merits
independent consideration. See Part IV.C., infra, for an extended discussion of the rationale for apportioning damages between a plaintiff guilty of simple negligence and a defendant guilty of aggravated
misconduct.
1 When the employer has deliberately injured the employee, the cause of action expressly is limited
to the excess of damages beyond the amount payable under the workers' compensation statute. W. Va.
Code § 23-4-2(b). Likewise, when the employer intentionally has exposed the employee to an unsafe
condition, recovery is limited to the excess above the amount of statutory compensation.
"' See, e.g., Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854 (,V. Va. 1982); Annot.,
9 A.L.R. 4th 633 (1981 & Supp. 1986).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1987

19

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 89, Iss. 4 [1987], Art. 12
1058

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89

of a defective product based on negligence or strict liability with the fault of
an employer liable for aggravated misconduct in altering or misusing that product.8 9 In general, juries are entirely capable of comparing the negligence of one
tortfeasor with the aggravated misconduct of another tortfeasor.90
The more difficult issue in statutory Mandolidis actions is whether third
party defendants should share in the setoff received by the employer for amounts
payable to the plaintiff under the workers' compensation statute. If the employee were to sue the employer and the third party in separate actions, the
workers' compensation benefits would be subtracted from the damages owed
by the employer, but they would not be subtracted from the damages owed by
the third party defendant because of the "collateral source rule." 9'
If the employer and the third party are parties to a single action, with a
cross-claim for contribution, how should the setoff for compensation benefits
be reflected? Under current law, the setoff for compensation benefits would
be limited to the employer, so that the plaintiff would obtain judgments in
different amounts against the two defendants. The question would then arise
as to computation of the amount of contribution.
Suppose that the plaintiff received a judgment against a third party for
$100,000, but that because of workers' compensation benefits totalling $20,000,
the judgment against the employer was for $80,000. Suppose further that the
employer was seventy percent at fault and the third party thirty percent at
fault. If the employee first recovered $100,000 from the third party, the third
party could then obtain contribution of seventy percent, or $70,000, from the
employer. On the other hand, the employee might first recover $80,000 from
the employer and then recover the other $20,000 from the third party. Under
current law, the employer could not seek contribution from the third party
because the employer was guilty of aggravated misconduct. But if, as is recommended in this Article, the employer were permitted to seek contribution,
it could recover from the third party thirty percent of its $80,000 payment, or
$24,000.

Cf. Sydenstricker v. Unipunch Prods., Inc., 169 W. Va. 440, 288 S.E.2d 511 (1982). In answer
to certified questions, the court in Sydenstricker held that a third-party defendant was entitled to seek
contribution from an employer guilty of aggravated misconduct. Although the court in that case did
not discuss how contribution was to be apportioned, two weeks later the court issued the Sitzes decision
in which it adopted the method of comparative contribution. It is therefore quite likely that the court
had comparative contribution in mind when it decided Sydenstricker.
9 Cf. infra, notes 166-72 concerning apportionment of fault between plaintiffs guilty of simple
negligence and defendants guilty of aggravated misconduct.
91Jones v. Laird Found., Inc., 156 W. Va. 479, 195 S.E.2d 821 (1973). See Ilosky v. Michelin
Tire Corp., 307 S.E.2d 603, 614-15 (W. Va. 1985); National Fruit Prod. Co. v. Baltimore & O.R.R.
Co., 329 S.E.2d 125, 132 (W. Va. 1985).
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Note that in either case the plaintiff would recover the entire $100,000, in
addition to his compensation benefits, but the consequences for the third party
and the employer would depend upon which party was seeking contribution.
If the employee proceeded first against the third party, who then obtained
contribution from the employer, the net payments would be $30,000 by the
third party and $70,000 by the employer. If the employee proceeded first against
the employer, with the third party then paying the balance of the judgment to
the plaintiff as well as contribution to the employer, the net payments would
be $44,000 by the third party and $56,000 by the employer.
There is a relatively simple solution to the foregoing anomaly: limit the
plaintiff to satisfaction in an amount equal to the weighted average of the two
judgments, each judgment being "weighted" by the proportionate share of fault
attributable to that party. Although this solution sounds complex, the computation is really quite easy. In the above example, plaintiffs total recovery
would be thirty percent of the $100,000 judgment against the third party, or
$30,000, and seventy percent of the $80,000 judgment against the employer,
or $56,000, for a total of $86,000. Regardless of which party the plaintiff
proceeded against first, each of the defendants would pay its proportionate
share, and the plaintiff would suffer a proportionate but not a total offset on
92
account of the workers' compensation benefits.
Another possible solution, which Stoneking recommends, is to extend the
setoff for workers' compensation benefits to the third-party defendant, so that
the resulting judgment against both parties would be for the same reduced
amount. In the above example, the plaintiff would be limited to a judgment
for $80,000. Regardless of which defendant the plaintiff proceeded against first,
the net outlays would be $24,000 by the third party and $56,000 by the employer.
While Stoneking's solution has the advantage of simplicity, it creates the
incongruous result that the plaintiff would fare substantially worse in a suit
against the third party if the employer were guilty of aggravated misconduct
than if the employer were entirely innocent of wrongdoing. In the absence of
the employer as a defendant, the employee could recover the full amount of
the damages from the third party due to the collateral source rule, without any
setoff for workers' compensation benefits. But if the employer were a party
and were liable for aggravated misconduct, the damages received by the plaintiff
would be reduced by the amount of workers' compensation benefits.

92Under joint and several liability, the plaintiff could either recover the entire $86,000 from the
third party, or else recover $80,000 from the employer and then $6,000 from the third party. In either
case, the defendants could then obtain contribution as to payments in excess of their equitable shares,
resulting in net payments of $30,000 by the third party and $56,000 by the employer.
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Stoneking's argument in favor of his proposed solution is cleverly deceptive.
He begins with the proposition that workers' compensation benefits are not
really paid by the employer to the employee but come from "a state-imposed
and operated system... outside of the tort system." 93 His second proposition
is that, within the tort system, the employer "should be treated like any other
tortfeasor. ' 94 From this he concludes that if the employer is entitled to a credit
for workers' compensation benefits, so too should any third-party defendants.
The fallacy in this logic is Stoneking's implicit rejection of the collateral
source rule. The employer is not like other tortfeasors with respect to workers'
compensation benefits because these benefits are from a collateral source relative to other tortfeasors but not as to the employer who contributes towards
those benefits. Since the employer differs from other tortfeasors in this respect,
it is entirely appropriate for the employer to be treated differently, receiving
a setoff for workers' compensation benefits that is not extended to other tortfeasors.
Stoneking tries to smooth over this difference by his initial proposition,
which suggests that the workers' compensation system is no more connected
to the employer than it'is to third parties. But if workers' compensation benefits
truly were independent of the employer, then they would be from a collateral
source relative to the employer, and it would follow that neither the employer
nor the third-party defendant should be entitled to any setoff.
Stoneking's discussion of the "one satisfaction" rule masks what is in effect
an assault on the collateral source rule itself. Stoneking is attempting to bootstrap the third-party defendant into the shoes of the employer without directly
addressing the fact that his proposal would in effect eliminate the collateral
source rule in the field of workers' compensation.95
The impact of Stoneking's proposal could extend far beyond the workers'
compensation system, however. It would apply whenever one of the defendants
in multi-party litigation could claim a setoff from a collateral source with respect to the other defendants, or when some but not all of the defendants were
subject to a special measure of damage liability. 6 It remains to be seen whether

91

Stoneking, supra note

1,

at 188.

Id.
9 In a related context, the court in NationalFruitProd.Co., 329 S.E.2d 125, held that the employer
was not entitled to bring an action against a negligent third party to recover for workers' compensation
benefits. The court said that to uphold such a cause of action would require reconsideration of established
doctrine, including the mitigation of damages rule and the collateral source rule, and that the rights of
employers, -employees, and third parties were "so intertwined" that a resolution of the issue was best
addressed by the legislature through the passage of a subrogation statute. Id. at 132.
'6For
example, under the Federal Tort Claims Act, the state measures of damages for wrongful
death in Massachusetts, Alabama, and Georgia are deemed to be punitive and do not apply to claims
94
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there is any justification for extending the setoff to all of the defendants, in
effect limiting the collateral source rule to payments from sources collateral to
all of the defendants who may be jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff,
such as a plaintiff's own accident, health, or disability insurance.
Since Mr. Stoneking does not address the issue directly, he does not suggest
any policy reasons that might warrant such a limitation on the collateral source
rule. Although his proposal has the advantage of simplicity, this alone would
not seem to be a sufficient reason for adopting it, since the alternative of a
weighted average of the two resulting judgments could be readily computed by
the court without any additional factfinding. In the absence of a policy reason
for departing from the collateral source rule in the case of joint tortfeasors
generally, there is no apparent basis for extending the credit for workers' compensation benefits to any defendants other than the employer. 97 In sum, the
employer and third-party defendants in Mandolidis actions should be treated
the same as defendants in all other actions with respect to setoffs for payments
from one of the co-defendants.
IV. PURE

COMPARATIVE FAULT

The discussion thus far has applied the principle of loss allocation to analyze issues involving comparative contribution among defendants. The principle
of loss allocation also has a direct bearing, however, on the comparative negligence rules for apportioning liability between plaintiffs and defendants. To
be blunt, only a rule of pure comparative negligence is consistent with the goal
of loss allocation. West Virginia's system of modified comparative negligence
undermines the justice and efficiency concerns that underlie the goal of loss
allocation. Moreover, decisions of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals

against federal defendants because of the FTCA's ban on an award of punitive damages against the
government. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co. v. United States, 352 U.S. 128 (1956) (Massachusetts);

Hartz v. United States, 415 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1969) (Georgia); Hoyt v. United States, 286 F.2d 356
(5th Cir. 1961) (Alabama). Several other courts of appeals have misinterpreted the FTCA's ban on
punitive damages as requiring departure from various aspects of a state's regular measure of damage

computation in actions against federal defendants. E.g., Flannery v. United States, 718 F.2d 108 (4th
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1226 (1984) (loss of enjoyment of life and offset for taxes); Hollinger
v. United States, 651 F.2d 636 (9th Cir. 1981Xoffset for tax liability and discounting to present value);
D'Ambra v. United States, 481 F.2d 14 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1075 (1973) (value of life of
child). As a result of the disparity between the regular state measure of damages and the rule applied
to federal defendants in these circuits, trial courts must make separate damage computations as to federal
and nonfederal co-defendants. See, e.g., Macey v. United States, 454 F. Supp. 684 (D. Alaska 1978).
See generally Lewin, supra note 66.

1 Rather than extend a credit for workers' compensation benefits to third-party defendants, a
better solution might be the enactment of a comprehensive subrogation statute under which the employer

could obtain contribution from third parties whose conduct gave rise to liability for compensation benefits. Cf. National Fruit Prod. Co., 329 S.E.2d 125; supra note 95.
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subsequent to Bradley have departed from the premise that served as the rationale for adoption of modified comparative negligence in that case.
A.

Justice and Comparative Negligence

1. Corrective Justice and Pure Comparative Negligence
The considerations of corrective justice that underlie loss allocation are
more fully realized under pure comparative negligence than under modified
comparative negligence. The corrective justice aspect of loss allocation includes
both the "compensation principle" -that claimants should be compensated for
damage done by others-and the "apportionment principle" -that a wrongdoer
should be liable for resulting damages.98 Pure comparative fault, which involves
pure comparative negligence between plaintiffs and defendants and pure comparative contribution among defendants, completely embodies both of these
principles. A party who is ten percent at fault pays ten percent of the losses
caused to others and recovers ninety percent of his own losses; a party who
is seventy percent at fault pays seventy percent of the losses caused to others
and recovers thirty percent of his own losses.
Modified comparative negligence is inconsistent with these equitable principles. The compensation principle is violated when a plaintiff who is only fifty
percent at fault receives no compensation. The apportionment principle is violated when a defendant who is fifty percent at fault pays nothing.
Proponents of modified comparative negligence argue that the denial of
compensation to a plaintiff who is fifty percent at fault is warranted by application of another equitable principle: that plaintiffs who are "substantially
responsible" for their own injuries are not entitled to compensation.99 In Bradley, the court expressly relied upon this principle, stating: "[W]e are not willing
to abandon the concept that where a party substantially contributes to his own
damages, he should not be permitted to recover for any part of them."' 0 0
A second principle, which is less frequently associated with systems of modified comparative negligence, focuses upon the duty of the defendants to pay

Note, supra note 15.
9 See Sobelsohn, supra note 2, at 86. The "New Hampshire rule" or "50% rule" allows recovery
when the plaintiff's negligence is "less than or equal to" the combined negligence of the defendants:
a plaintiff who is 50% at fault will recover 50% of the damages. The "Wisconsin rule," adopted by
the West Virginia court in Bradley, allows recovery only when the plaintiff's negligence is "less" than
the defendant's; a plaintiff who is 50% at fault recovers nothing. Both of these rules reflect the premise
that a plaintiff who is primarily responsible for his own injuries is not deserving of compensation. They
differ only in their definition of the threshold. See supra note 4.
1wBradley, 163 W. Va. at 341, 256 S.E.2d at 885.
"
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rather than upon the right of the plaintiffs to receive compensation. Also rooted
in notions of corrective justice, this principle holds that a negligent defendant
should not be compelled to pay compensation if the defendant is less at fault
than the plaintiff.10' This principle provides the basis for the rule in a handful
of jurisdictions which allows a plaintiff to recover only against those defendants
whose degree of fault is greater than (or greater than or equal to) the plaintiff's
degree of fault. 0 2 The West Virginia court has rejected this rule, however,

stating that the fault of the plaintiff is to be compared with all of the defendants
as a unit and not with each of the defendants individually. 10 3 Thus, modified
comparative negligence in West Virginia derives not from any concern about
unfairness to the individual defendants, but solely from the supposed unfairness
of allowing recovery for injuries primarily of the plaintiff's own making.
The premise that a person should not recover for injuries substantially of
his own making does not, however, support the existing rule of modified comparative negligence which draws the line at fifty percent. A plaintiff who is

forty-five percent at fault is also "substantially" responsible for his own injuries. So too is a plaintiff who is twenty-five percent at fault. A plaintiff who

is forty-nine percent at fault is nearly as responsible for his injuries as one
who is fifty percent at fault, yet under modified comparative negligence the
former recovers fifty-one percent of his damages while the latter recovers nothing. Ir"this respect, modified comparative negligence is just as arbitrary as the
rule of contributory negligence which it replaced. It simply shifts the threshhold
at which a claim will be barred by the plaintiff's own negligence from one
percent of the fault to fifty percent of the fault. 104
The principle that a person should be denied compensation for his own
wrongdoing is best satisfied by a rule of pure comparative negligence. Under

"I1See Sobelsohn, supra note 2, at 86-87.
ImThis is known as the "Georgia rule," based on Mishoe v. Davis, 64 Ga. App. 700, 14 S.E.2d
187 (1941). See also Rawson v. Lohsen, 145 N.J. Super. 71, 366 A.2d 1022 (1976); Marier v. Memorial
Rescue Serv., Inc., 296 Minn. 242, 207 N.W.2d 706 (1973). Under this rule, if P is 30% at fault, DI
is 45% at fault and D2 is 25% at fault, P may recover from DI but not from D2. The majority of
states, however, follow the "Arkansas rule," advanced in Walton v. Tull, 234 Ark. 882, 356 S.W.2d
20 (1962), under which the negligence of the plaintiff is compared with that of all the defendants
collectively. See Note, supra note 15, at 1673-74 and nn. 32, 33.
13 See Sitzes, 169 W. Va. at 712 and n.19, 289 S.E.2d at 687-88 and n.19. Cf. Bowman v. Barnes,
168 W. Va. 111, 282 S.E.2d 613 (1981).
104Courts and commentators are virtually unanimous in their condemnation of modified comparative fault as arbitrary. See, e.g., Alvis, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 27, 421 N.E.2d 886, 898; Placek, 405 Mich. 638,
660-62, 275 N.W.2d 511, 519, Kirby, 400 Mich. 585, 256 N.W.2d 400, 428; Scott, 96 N.M. 682, 634
P.2d 1234, 1242; Li, 13 Cal. 3d 804, 828, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 874, 532 P.2d 1226, 1242 (modified rule
"simply shifts the lottery aspect of the contributory negligence rule to a different ground"); Vincent v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 47 Wis.2d 120, 177 N.W.2d 513, 520 (Hallows, C.J., dissenting); R. Keeton, Comments on Maki v. Frelk-Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or Legislature
Decide?, 21 VMD. L. REv. 906, 911 (1968).
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pure comparative negligence, a wrongdoer is totally denied compensation to

the extent of his own fault: the recovery of a plaintiff who is forty percent at
fault is reduced by forty percent; the recovery of a plaintiff who is seventy
percent at fault is reduced by seventy percent. It is for this reason that the
overwhelming majority of jurists'05 and scholars 10 6 deem pure comparative negligence to be the fairer rule. The modified rule that denies all compensation
to a plaintiff fifty percent or more at fault is not based on fairness but on
retribution. 0 7

Moreover, the premise underlying modified comparative negligence-that
a person should not receive compensation for losses primarily of his own making-has recently been rejected by the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals.
In Sitzes v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 0 s the court held that a defendant
whose share of fault was seventy percent could obtain contribution from a codefendant whose share of fault was only thirty percent. The court found that
the defendant who was seventy percent at fault would be entitled to contribution
based on "equitable principles" because he had "paid more than his pro tanto
share."' 1 9 Although the opinion in Sitzes declared that "[n]othing in Bradley
bears on the right of contribution,"" 0 the adoption in Sitzes of "pure" equitable contribution is entirely inconsistent with Bradley."'
105In addition to the judicial decisions cited supra at note 3, see Day v. General Motors Corp.,
345 N.W.2d 349 (N.D. 1984) (applying pure comparative fault to products liability cases); Vincent, 47
Wis.2d at 124, 177 N.W.2d at 518 (1970) (Hallows, C.J., dissenting). Cf.United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397, 408 (1975) (adopting pure comparative negligence for apportioning property
damages in admiralty, in lieu of former divided damages rule). But see Langley v. Boyter, 284 S.C.
162, 325 S.E.2d 550 (1984), rev'd on procedural grounds, 286 S.C. 85, 332 S.E.2d 100 (1985) (adopting
"not greater than" version of modified rule).
116
See, e.g., V. ScnwARTz, supra note 2, at 363; Cady, Alas and Alack, Modified Comparative
Negligence Comes to West Virginia, 82 W. VA. L. REv. 473 (1980); Campbell, Recent Developments
of the Law of Negligence inWisconsin-Part II, 1956 Wis. L. REv. 4; Davis, Comparative Negligence,
Comparative Contribution, and Equal Protection in the Trial and Settlement of Multiple Defendant
Product Cases, 10 IND. L. Ray. 831 (1977); Fleming, supra note 58, at 1468-70; Gregory, Loss Dis.
tribution by Comparative Negligence, 21 MRlN. L. Rav. 1 (1936); Jeunger, Brief for Negligence Law
Section of the State Bar of Michigan in Support of Comparative Negligence as Amicus Curiae, Parsonson
v. Construction Equipment Co., 18 WAYNE L. REv. 3 (1972); P. Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 28 Sw. L. J. 1, 9 (1974); R. Keeton, supra note 104, at 916; Prosser, supra note 68, at 508;
Turk, supra note 66, at 344-45; Wade, supra note 38, at 224-25. But see C.R. HE r & C.J. HnFt,
COMPARAIVE NEG-IGENCE MAzuA (J. Palmer & S. Flanagan rev. ed. 1985); Sobelsohn, supra note 2.
Among state legislatures, modified comparative negligence is clearly preferred. Of the 33 legislatures
which have adopted comparative negligence, only 6 chose the pure form: Arizona, Louisiana, Mississippi,
New York, Rhode Island, and Washington. See V. ScawArTz, supra note 2, at § 3.2; H. WooDs, supra
note 2, at § 4.2.
w See Scott, 624 P.2d at 1241-42. See also Sobelsohn, supra note 2, at 90: modified comparative
fault "serves as a tool of corrective-or even retributive-justice." Cf.Stoneking, supra note 1, at 17778 (discussing denial of contribution to tortfeasors whose wrongful acts were malum in se).
10

Sitzes, 169 W. Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 279.

119
Id. at 715, 289 S.E.2d at 689.
110 Id.,

"I

289 S.E.2d at 689.

Stoneking states that the rule adopted in Sitzes "may be referred to as 'pure' comparative
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To illustrate, consider the following variation on an earlier hypothetical:
suppose A was a passenger in a car driven by B that collided with a car driven
by C; A sued B for his own damages; B sued C both for his own damages
and for contribution as to A's damages; the jury determined that B was seventy
percent at fault and C was thirty percent at fault. Under Bradley, B would be
barred from recovering against C for his own damages, but under Sitzes B
would be permitted to seek contribution from C as to A's damages. Is there
any reason why B should be denied compensation as a plaintiff for his own
property damage and personal injuries while being allowed to seek contribution
as a third-party plaintiff on a cross- claim for his financial losses arising out
of the same accident?
Bradley and Sitzes are irreconcilable under any principled anaylsis. There
is no logical or practical distinction between a suit by B against C for his own
damages and a suit by B against C for contribution toward damages B owes
to A. Either B should be able to sue C both for contribution and for his own
damages, or B should be barred from recovering entirely. The equitable principles underlying the court's decision in Sitzes suggest that the correct result
is to allow recovery in both cases under a system of pure comparative fault.
2.

Distributive Justice and Pure Comparative Negligence

In adopting a system of modified comparative negligence, the court in Bradley said that a pure system "favors the party who has incurred the most damages regardless of his amount of fault or negligence.' 12 The court posed the
hypothetical of a plaintiff who was ten percent at fault and suffered $20,000
in damages in an accident with a defendant who was ninety percent at fault
and suffered $800,000 in damages. The court correctly pointed out that under
a pure system of comparative negligence, the plaintiff would recover $18,000
of his damages while the defendant would recover $80,000 of his damages.
From these facts, the court incorrectly concluded that a pure system would
"favor" the defendant in such a case.
The fallacy in the court's analysis was its focus on the amount of the
judgment, rather than on the parties' net losses. Although it is true that the
defendant in this hypothetical recovers the larger judgment, it is also true that
each party bears exactly its proportionate share of the total losses from the
accident. Of the $820,000 in total damages, the plaintiff bears ten percent, or

M Stoneking states that the rule adopted in Sitzes "may be referred to as 'pure' comparative
contribution." Stoneking, supra note 1, at 175. He does not consider the inconsistency between pure
comparative contribution and modified comparative negligence.
112Bradley, 165 W. Va. at 338, 256 S.E.2d at 883.
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$82,000, and the defendant bears ninety percent, or $738,000.11 As long as
one assumes that the accident would not have occurred absent the fault of both
parties, the rule of pure comparative negligence produces a reasonable and fair
loss allocation.
By contrast, application of modified comparative negligence to the above
hypothetical yields entirely unsatisfactory results. The plaintiff receives compensation for ninety percent of his own injuries, while paying nothing whatsoever for the large losses incurred by the defendant for which the plaintiff
was partially responsible. It is for this reason that most courts and commentators have concluded that the disproportionate counterclaim hypothetical provides an argument against modified
comparative negligence and in favor of
14
pure comparative negligence.
One commentator has suggested that the foregoing hypothetical illustrates
the tendency of pure comparative negligence to favor the wealthy at the expense
of the poor because the wealthy, having more property and greater income,
tend to suffer greater accident losses and would reap a greater share of the
judgments awarded to plaintiffs under pure comparative negligence."' The underlying premise that the rich, on the average, do suffer greater damages is
probably true, but the argument proves too much. If the rich tend to suffer
more damages than the poor from automobile accidents, does it follow that
the damages suffered in all automobile accidents should fall where they may,
without compensation? If one were to reject every legal rule that tended to
protect the "haves" to a greater extent than the "have-nots," one would be
forced to abandon virtually every rule of tort, contract, and property law, since
all civil law tends to protect and perpetuate the existing distribution of resources.

Even if one were to accept the argument that any rule that facilitates compensation for damages tends to favor the "haves" at the expense of the "have-

" The plaintiff's net loss is $20,000 in actual damages, less $18,000 recovered from the defendant,
plus $80,000 paid to the defendant, for a total of $82,000. The defendant's net loss is $800,000 in actual
damages, plus $18,000 paid to the plaintiff, minus $80,000 recovered from the plaintiff, for a total of
$738,000.
""Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. at 406; Alvis, 85 Ill.
2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 'at 897; Scott, 96 N.M.
682, 634 P.2d at 1241-42; Hoffman, 280 So. 2d at 439. See V. ScnwA~Rz, supra note 2, at 360-61;
Cady, supra note 106, at 483-86 (1980); Wade, Uniform Comparative Fault A~t, 14 FoRum 379, 38586 (1979); R. Keeton, supra note 104, at 911; Oliver, Let Us be Frank About dpmparativeNegligence,
28 L.A.B. ButL. 119, 144-45 (1953); Note, supra note 15, at 1671. But see Bradley, 163 W. Va. at 338,
256 S.E.2d at 883; C.R. Heft & C.J. Heft, supra note 106, at § 1.50.
"'
Sobelsohn, supra note 2, at 88 n.123:
This argument perhaps looms larger when one realizes that the size of a damages award
depends in part on the accident victim's income and medical expenses, both of which, in turn,
reflect an accident victim's overall wealth. Thus, pure comparative fault may aggravate the
tort system's already existing bias in favor of wealthy individuals.
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nots," it does not follow that the poor benefit from a rule of modified comparative negligence that results in a greater number of uncompensated losses.
The hypothetical involving the disproportionate counterclaim is misleading in
several respects, and it obscures the tendency of modified comparative negligence to affect the poor more severely than it affects the well-to-do.
First, the hypothetical creates a distorted picture of the overall impact of
comparative negligence. The hypothetical assumes that the poorer party, who
suffered the lesser amount of damages, would also be the party less at fault.
Unless one believes that the poor tend to be more careful than the rich, however, it is equally likely that the poor plaintiff who suffered $20,000 in damages
would be ninety percent at fault, and the defendant who suffered $800,000 in
damages would be ten percent at fault. The hypothetical also involves an extreme situation in which both the relative fault and the relative damages of
the two parties were entirely disproportionate. A more complete analysis, considering cases in which the fault was apportioned forty/sixty or fifty/fifty,
and cases in which the damages of both parties were on the same order of
magnitude, would create a more balanced picture.
Second, it is not necessarily true that the poorer litigant will always have
suffered less damages. In autombile accidents, the rich may incur greater damages on the average, but there will be many collisions in which the poorer
6
driver suffers greater losses."
Third, and perhaps most importantly, even assuming that on the average
rich plaintiffs suffer greater damages than poor plaintiffs, it does not follow
that the rich would reap more of the benefit from a switch to pure comparative
negligence. The argument that pure comparative negligence favors the rich is
premised on the further incorrect assumption that plaintiffs, as a class, are as
wealthy as defendants, as a class. In this respect, the automobile collision paradigm is misleading, for it represents a special case in which plaintiffs and
defendants are equally wealthy because both are members of the same classdrivers. In a collision between a poor driver and a rich driver, the poor person
has an equal chance of being either a plaintiff or a defendant, so that, on the
average, plaintiffs and defendants should tend to be equally wealthy. In the
unique circumstances of the collision paradigm, in which plaintiffs and defendants are interchangeable, it is true that under pure comparative negligence the
gains of substantially negligent rich drivers as plaintiffs, on the average, would
exceed the losses of rich drivers as defendants when sued by substantially negligent poor plaintiffs.
The result is entirely different, however, in situations in which the plaintiffs
as a class tend to be less well off than the defendants as a class. When applied

116To the extent that wealthier persons drive safer cars, it may not even be true that on the average

the rich incur greater damages.
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to cases in which the plaintiffs are poorer than the defendants, the rule of
modified comparative fault, which denies compensation to substantially negligent plaintiffs, systematically tends to redistribute resources away from the
poor.
There are several important paradigmatic situations in which the plaintiffs
systematically tend to be poorer than the defendants. One example is product
liability. Although there may be occasional exceptions, consumers and other
parties injured by defective products tend to have fewer resources than the
manufacturers of those products.1 7 The same is true of tort claims by tenants
against landlords. For any category of cases in which plaintiffs tend to be
poorer than defendants, adoption of pure comparative negligence would tend
to redistribute resources from the rich to the poor. There are many such cases
in which plaintiffs tend to be poorer than defendants, but few in which plaintiffs tend to be wealthier than defendants. Accordingly, when one considers
the total dollar value of uncompensated damages suffered by plaintiffs under
modified comparative negligence that would be recovered from defendants under pure comparative negligence, it is doubtful whether adoption of pure comparative negligence would tend to favor the rich.
Finally, even if it were true that a switch to pure comparative negligence
would result in a net transfer of resources from the poor to the rich, it does
not follow that the current rule of modified comparative negligence favors the
poor. Typically, the rich tend to have greater resources with which to absorb
their losses, and they tend to be more fully insured. Thus, the wealthy individual
who suffers uncompensated losses of $800,000 probably has other resources,
including ample medical and disability insurance, to reduce the net impact of
the accident. For the poor person who suffers a loss of $20,000, on the other
hand, there may be no reserves to cushion the financial blow, and he is less
likely to have complete medical and disability coverage. Thus, the rule of modified comparative negligence, which in some cases leaves plaintiffs' losses totally
uncompensated, tends to affect the poor more severely than the rich.
Once it is recognized that many poor and middle income individuals suffer
substantial damages in accidents in which they are fifty percent or Imore at
fault, it is apparent that the criterion of distributive justice weighs against the
current rule of modified comparative negligence. In sum, considerations of both
distributive and corrective justice support adoption of pure comparative negligence.
B.

Efficiency and Comparative Fault

Although the controversy between advocates of pure and modified comparative negligence has focused on the criteria of justice and fairness, many
"1 While the "consumer" is usually an individual, there will be cases in which the consumer of
industrial equipment is a corporation having even more resources than the manufacturer.
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of the secondary arguments have dealt with issues of economic efficiency. The
most frequently discussed issues have involved the relative administrative costs
of the two approaches in terms of the number of lawsuits, the ease of settlement, and the cost of litigation. " 8 Relatively less attention has been paid to
the more important issues of incentives, allocative efficiency, and loss spreading.

119

In analyzing the relative efficiency of pure and modified comparative negligence, insufficient attention has been paid to the two dissimilar paradigmatic
situations in which comparative negligence is likely to be applied to personal
injury litigation-automobile accidents and product liability. The key difference
between these two situations is that in the former there is no distinction between
the class of plaintiffs and the class of defendants, whereas in the latter, the
classes of plaintiffs and defendants are almost entirely separate. The driver of
an automobile does not know whether, if there is an accident, he will be a
plaintiff or a defendant; given the likelihood of counterclaims, he probably
will be both. With regard to product liability litigation, however, most individual consumers can expect to be plaintiffs, whereas most manufacturers can
expect to be defendants. 120 The distinctiveness of the identity of the parties has
a direct bearing on the question of relative incentives and allocative efficiency.
The relevance of this distinction will be emphasized in the following analysis.
1. Efficient Incentives.
It has been suggested that pure comparative negligence reduces the incentive
to act prudently because it allows even the substantially negligent plaintiff to
obtain compensation.' 12 With respect to product liability litigation, it is true
,8 See, e.g., R. PostuR, supra note 17, at 157; Sobelsohn, supra note 2, at 81-83 and the sources
therein cited.
M19
But see, Haddock & Curran, supra note 22 and the sources cited therein.
,- The distinction is not universal. The "consumer" of industrial equipment may be the employer
of an injured employee, in which case the consumer would be a defendant in a Mandolidis suit by the
employee, or it could be a third-party defendant in an action for contribution by the manufacturer as
third-party plaintiff.
2, Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STuD. 323 (1973). On the other
hand, Richard Posner at one time suggested that comparative negligence was inefficient because it created
too much incentive to take care by inducing both parties to take care in situations when it would have
been more efficient for only one of the parties to do so. R. Posan, EcoNowc ANALYsis OF LAW 124
(2d ed. 1977). A recent article criticizes Posner's approach and mathematically demonstrates that, in
theory, pure and modified comparative negligence should result in equivalent incentives to take care.
Haddock & Curran, supra note 22. Their conclusions are premised on the assumption that the potential
plaintiffs will rationally expect all or most potential defendants to be acting efficiently and non-negligently, in which case plaintiffs would expect to bear the entire cost of all accidents. See also Veljanovski,
The Economic Theory of Tort Liability-Toward a Corrective Justice Approach, in THE EcoNohnc
APPROACH TO LAW 142-43, (P. Burrows & C. Veljanovski, eds. 1981) asserting that victims would have
appropriate incentives to take care in his proposed regime of strict liability with a defense of comparative
negligence.
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that pure comparative negligence may tend at the margin to cause consumers
to be less careful. On the other hand, it is also true that under modified comparative negligence manufacturers may exercise too little care to the extent that
they escape liability entirely whenever the consumer is fifty percent or more
at fault. 122 Pure comparative negligence would impose upon manufacturers the
full proportionate cost of damages caused by their defective products, thereby
inducing a corresponding increase in the level of the care adopted by manufacturers. Since it would appear that overall product safety is more sensitive
to the care exercised by manufacturers to the care exercised by consumers, it
follows that a rule of pure comparative negligence would tend to create better
incentives than modified comparative negligence.
Moreover, it is uncertain whether consumers truly would exercise less care
simply because of a change in the rules of liability. Unlike a manufacturer,
which makes an economic decision weighing the costs and benefits of product
safety, the consumer's exercise or lack of due care may reflect entirely noneconomic factors such as mood, state of mind, or random distractions. 2, Even
insofar as consumers consciously decide whether to exercise due care, their
actions are based on their subjective fear of injury rather than on their evaluation of the likelihood of receiving compensation. The prospect of litigation
24
is too remote to affect the day-to-day decisions of the average consumer.
Even a consumer who anticipated receiving an award of full compensation for
the injuries resulting from an accident could be expected to exercise due care
solely out of fear of the immediate painful consequences,'2 especially if those
consequences included the prospect of death. 126 In short, those who believe that
the prospect of damage awards for substantially negligent plaintiffs in product
liability litigation under pure comparative fault would significantly influence
consumer behavior have spent too much time in academia. Thus, with regard
to product liability litigation, when plaintiffs and defendants come from distinct
subsets of the population, pure comparative fault would tend to improve the

"I Under a rule of modified comparative fault, manufacturers would only invest in an efficient
level of safety precautions if they anticipated that all consumers would be less than 500o at fault. Cf.
A. M. Polinksy, supra note 17, at 43, asserting that a rule of strict liability with a contributory negligence
defense results in an efficient level of care because potential injurers assume that their victims will be
exercising due care.
"I See Schwartz, Contributoryand Comparative Negligence: A Reappraisal,87 YAM L.J. 697, 71321 (1978), asserting that most accidents result from inadvertant, mindless, or irrational acts.
11,The term "average consumer" would not include persons who have attended law school and
have been uniquely trained to perceive ordinary activities in terms of their potential for litigation. See
id. at 710-11.
125How many successful tort plaintiffs would refuse an "offer" to be restored to their pre-accident
condition in return for relinquishment of their court-awarded damages, especially when those damages
were net of attorney fees and expenses? See id. at 711.
'2
See id. at 712. Would anyone seriously argue that the prospect of an award of wrongful death
damages to survivors would induce a nonsuicidal consumer to subject himself to the risk of death?
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incentives for defendants to adopt efficient safety precautions without substantially lowering the standard of care among plaintiffs.
The analysis is more complex in the case of automobile accidents, both
because plaintiffs and defendants are members of the same subgroup (drivers)
and because of the prevalence of liability insurance. To the extent that pure
comparative negligence increased the compensation for the more negligent
plaintiffs, it also would increase the cost of liability for the less negligent
defendants. On balance, in the absence of insurance, any increase in the amount
recovered by negligent plaintiff drivers would be exactly offset by increased
amounts paid by negligent defendant drivers. The net impact on incentives
would be zero.
The fact that most drivers carry liability insurance only slightly alters the
foregoing analysis. To the extent that drivers have liability insurance, they have
relatively less incentive to exercise due care regardless of the applicable legal
rule. 27 Because of liability insurance, the disincentive effects from an increase
in recoveries by negligent plaintiffs under pure comparative negligence would
not be directly offset by increased damage liability of defendants insofar as
their increased liability was absorbed by the liability insurance companies.
On the other hand, to the extent that insurance costs are affected by accident records, at least part of the increased liability from pure comparative
negligence would be passed on to negligent drivers. More importantly, because
of the "moral hazard" problem, insurance companies do not fully cover all
risks, but instead provide for deductibles and coinsurance, with the insured
party paying a portion of any accident liability. The existence of deductibles
and coinsurance, coupled with the prospect of increasing insurance rates following an accident, should tend to offset most of the diminished incentives
resulting from the existence of insurance. The net impact on incentives should
be slight.
Finally, and most importantly, any expectation of increased compensation
to plaintiffs through litigation or insurance under pure comparative fault would
not significantly reduce the primary incentive to drive safely-the fear of injury
to self and others. The economic arguments about incentives for safe driving
tend to ignore human nature and assume that in determining how safely to
drive, individuals primarily consider their own economic losses and the possibility of economic liability for injuries to others. 28 Most people who reflect
on the question would not consider the monetary damages recoverable in a
lawsuit as sufficient compensation for their pain and suffering. Moreover, re-

'7 The reduction of incentives to exercise care among insured parties is known as "moral hazard."
See A. M. PouNsKy, supra note 17, at 54.
'2 See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 17; Haddock & Curran, supra note 22; Brown, supra note
121. Compare Schwartz, supra note 123, at 713-21.
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gardless of the existence of insurance, most people who reflect on the question
would be horrified at the prospect of causing substantial injury to another
human being. Thus, as was the case with consumers in the field of product
liability, the impact of comparative fault on the incentives of most drivers
would be minimal.
On balance, the criterion of efficient incentives to exercise due care weighs
in favor of pure comparative negligence. Due to the reciprocal nature of the
risks from careless driving, pure comparative negligence would have at most
a minimal negative impact on the incentives of drivers. The pure rule, however,
would create significantly better incentives in fields such as product liability,
in which the risks are nonreciprocal, because the modified rule now shields
injuring parties from bearing their proportionate share of liability for the damages they cause.
2. Allocative Efficiency
As was the case with incentives to exercise care, evaluation of the relative
allocative efficiency of pure and modified comparative negligence requires separate analysis of automobile accident and product liability litigation. In automobile accident litigation, the choice between pure and modified comparative
negligence should have little or no impact on the allocation of resources. Regardless whether the plaintiff or the defendant absorbs the cost of an accident,
those costs remain internal to the activity of driving.
If there is any difference between the two rules, it would tend to favor
pure over modified comparative negligence. The reason is that accident costs
paid by a defendant's liability insurer under pure comparative negligence remain
a cost of driving, whereas accident costs paid by the plaintiff's health, accident,
and disability insurance under modified comparative negligence are not treated
as a cost of driving. To the extent that the costs of accidents are subsidized
by nondrivers under modified comparative negligence, it would appear that pure
comparative negligence is slightly better in terms of allocative efficiency.
The preference for pure comparative negligence is far stronger with respect
to product liability. Under pure comparative fault, manufacturers must pay
their proportionate share of all damages caused by their products. Under modified comparative fault, however, certain negligent consumers injured by defective products are barred from recovery, and the manufacturers do not bear
their proportionate share of the resulting damages.
The failure of these plaintiffs to recover would not cause any allocational
problems if consumers could accurately assess the risk of an unsafe product.
Armed with this knowledge, they could deduct the dollar value of this risk
from the price they are willing to pay for the product, thereby causing the cost
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29
of these damages to be reflected in the price and output of the product.
Unfortunately, consumers do not possess sufficient acumen or information to
evaluate the risks from defective products, and there is little incentive for manufacturers to inform consumers of these risks. 130 Also, much of the risk from
defective products is borne by third parties who are not purchasers and cannot
possibly affect the price or output of the product."' To the extent that manufacturers are relieved of liability for injuries caused by defective products
under a rule of modified comparative fault, the price does not reflect the full
cost of their products. As a result, profitability of these manufacturers is artificially enhanced, and too many resources are invested in industries that produce defective products. 32 Society would profit if those resources were invested
elsewhere, as they would be under a system of pure comparative fault in which
all activities paid the proportionate share of the damages they caused.

Thus, in terms of allocative efficiency, the rule of pure comparative negligence is preferable because it "internalizes" more of the costs, imposing the
costs on participants in the damaging activity. The pure rule is only slightly
superior to the modified rule in activities in which the risks are reciprocal, such
as driving, because only a small percentage of the uncompensated losses are
shifted to nonparticipants in the damaging activity. The pure rule is far superior
in fields such as product liability, in which the risks are nonreciprocal and are
often borne by third parties, since most of the uncompensated losses under the
modified rule will not be reflected as costs of the damaging activity, resulting
in an inefficiently high commitment of resources to that activity.
3.

Loss Spreading, Risk Spreading, and Insurance

The related goals of loss spreading and risk spreading unequivocally weigh
in favor of pure comparative fault. The spreading of losses to persons other
than the victim is efficient insofar as it reduces the economic and personal
dislocations which result from imposition of substantial losses on a single individual or entity. 3 3 The spreading of risk through insurance is efficient in that
it eliminates the subjective sense of displeasure experienced by persons who
face the risk of a substantial uncompensated loss. 34 Customers are willing to

'1 See A. M. PoUNsKy, supra note 17, at 96-97; R. POSNER, supra note 17, at 134-35; Some
Thoughts, supra note 18, at 505.
I" See R. PosNER, supra note 17, at 166; R. POsNER, EcoNohilc ANALYSIS OF LAW 136 (2d ed.
1977); A. M. PouwsKy, supra note 17, at 97-99.
"I A. M. PouNsKY, supra note 17, at 103.
132See id. at 97-99. Cf. Some Thoughts, supra note 18, at 503-14.
" Some Thoughts, supra note 18, at 517-19.
" To the extent that it exceeds the actual "expected value" of the anticipated loss, this subjective
displeasure at the prospect of such a loss is called "risk bearing cost." See Gorz, LAW AND EcONOWCS
123-27 (1984); A. M. PoLuNsKY, supra note 17, at 53-55.
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pay more than the "expected value" of their risks in order to eliminate these
subjective risk-bearing costs. The differential enables the insurance companies
who pool these risks to cover their operating costs and to generate substantial
profits. Their profitability reflects the value to society of risk reduction through
insurance.
Since modified comparative fault causes certain plaintiffs to bear all of
their own damages, it is less effective than pure comparative fault at both loss
spreading and risk spreading. Pure comparative fault is superior at spreading
losses insofar as a substantially negligent plaintiff can still obtain some compensation from a defendant. The loss is spread to at least two parties, instead
of being borne entirely by the plaintiff.
More importantly, because defendants tend to be more fully covered by
insurance, pure comparative fault achieves better loss spreading as well as better
risk spreading. While defendants can obtain virtually complete liability coverage
(except to the extent of deductibles or coinsurance), many of the losses sustained
by plaintiffs will not be covered by insurance and cannot be spread to third
parties. Plaintiffs may have first-party coverage for medical care and lost wages,
but the deductibles, coinsurance, and waiting periods tend to result in less
complete coverage than defendants receive under liability policies.
Most significantly, the plaintiff is unlikely to have any insurance coverage
for the intangible aspects of personal injuries-pain and suffering, emotional
distress, and loss of enjoyment of life-whereas these items of damage would
be covered under the defendant's liability insurance policy. Under modified
comparative negligence, the intangible losses suffered by a substantially negligent plaintiff, as well as any other uninsured losses, are borne by the plaintiff
alone. Under pure comparative negligence, however, these costs are shared with
the defendant, and secondarily with the defendant's insurer. The net result is
better loss spreading, as well as a reduction in the subjective risk costs experienced by the parties.
4.

Administrative Costs

In comparison with the foregoing analysis of incentives, allocative efficiency, and loss and risk spreading, the evaluation of the administrative costs
of pure and modified comparative negligence is relatively straightforward. But
while the process may be simpler, the results are more equivocal.
Proponents of modified comparative fault correctly argue that adoption of
a rule of pure comparative negligence would lead to an increasing number of
claims and lawsuits.' 35 A plaintiff who was substantially at greater fault than

"I See Sobelsohn, supra note 2, at 81-83 and sources cited therein.
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the defendant, one whose share of fault was seventy, ninety, or ninety-nine
percent, probably would not bother filing suit under modified comparative negligence, but might under pure comparative negligence.
Proponents of modified comparative fault argue further that a pure system
would lead to an increasing number of nuisance suits by plaintiffs tempted by
the prospect of a one percent or five percent recovery. 3 6 They also argue that
litigation costs would be greater because defendants would be unable to obtain
summary judgment, whereas under a modified rule there would be cases in
which summary judgment could be granted in the absence of dispute that the
plaintiff was more at fault than the defendant.1 37 These two arguments are
without merit, for they beg the question by presuming that these are lawsuits
that should not have been filed. To the contrary, if the premises of pure comparative fault are accepted, then even a suit by a plaintiff who is ninety-nine
percent at fault would not be a nuisance suit, and the defendant in such a case
should not be able to obtain summary judgment. Nevertheless, the fact remains
that pure comparative fault can be expected to generate a greater number of
claims.
On the other hand, proponents of pure comparative negligence argue that
litigation under this rule would be simpler and less expensive. The administrative simplicity of pure comparative fault is often expressed in conclusory
terms, without explanation or analysis.' 38 Nevertheless, there are several reasons
why litigation under pure comparative negligence can be expected to be less
costly than under modified comparative negligence. Because modified comparative negligence retains a bright-line cutoff, it requires greater precision in
instructing the jury, especially as to the significance of a finding that the plaintiff's fault is equal to that of the defendant. 3 9 A related point is that modified
comparative fault may encourage appeals on the question of whether the jury
could have found that 4the plaintiff's negligence was less than or greater than
that of the defendant.1
Most importantly, the pure rule reduces litigation costs by promoting settlement of disputes. In theory, settlement should result whenever the gap between each party's evaluation of its expected outcome at trial is less than the

13 Id.

Id. at 82 n.94.
E.g., Kaatz, 540 P.2d at 1049; Goetzman, 327 N.W.2d at 754.
See Sobelsohn, supra note 2, at 78.
"
'
Hilen, 673 S.W.2d at 719. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Putnam County Comm'n, 327 S.E.2d 458
(NV. Va. 1985) (affirming appeal concerning instructions by a plaintiff found 51% at fault); Chaves v.
Blue Ridge Acres, Inc., 324 S.E.2d 361 (NV. Va. 1984) (appeal by plaintiff found 50% at fault affirmed
on merits but reversed as to award of costs). Cf. Prosser, supra note 68, at 484-89 (noting excessive
appeals in jurisdictions employing the rule that plaintiff's contributory negligence is not a bar if it is
"slight" and the defendant's negligence is "gross").
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total of their respective litigation costs. 41 Settlement is easier under the pure
rule because the expectations of the plaintiff and defendant tend to be more
similar, facilitating achievement of a mutually acceptable compromise. 42
To illustrate, consider a case in which the plaintiff's damages were $10,000
and the fault of the plaintiff and the defendant were approximately equal.
Given human nature, each participant would evaluate the facts in the light most
favorable to himself. 43 Thus, the plaintiff might believe that the defendant was
at least sixty percent at fault, whereas the defendant might believe that the
plaintiff was at least sixty percent at fault. Under a pure rule, the plaintiff
would anticipate receiving a judgment for $6,000 and the defendant would
anticipate paying $4,000. Under a modified rule, however, the plaintiff would
still anticipate recovery of $6,000, but the defendant would anticipate escaping
liability entirely. The parties would then be $6,000 apart instead of $2,000, so
settlement would be less likely under a modified rule. 144
It remains to be seen whether the anticipated higher settlement rate under
the pure rule, coupled with the savings from its greater simplicity, would offset
the added administrative costs incurred because of the greater number of claims
filed under the pure rule. There is little empirical data on this subject. 45 In
any event, it does not appear that the administrative costs of a pure rule would
be so great as to cancel the significant efficiency gains derived from improved
incentives, better resource allocation, and greater loss spreading and risk

'" See R. PosNmR, supra note 17, at 522-25; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 55, at 966-77.
Virtually all suits by plaintiffs who could expect to be found 90%-99% at fault should settle prior to
trial, since the anticipated recovery would exceed the cost of litigation. Cf. Sobelsohn, supra note 2, at
82; Prosser, supra note 68, at 494.
142 Oliver, supra note 114, at 140-41.
143 See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 55, at 975:
The exact odds for any given outcome in court are unknown, and it has been suggested that
litigants typically overestimate their chances of winning. To the extent that one or both of
the parties typically overestimate their chances of winning, more cases will be litigated than
in a world in which the outcome is uncertain but the odds are known.
Id.
144 See id.
141 V. Scmv.trz, supra note 2, at 362. A frequently cited survey conducted during Arkansas' oneyear experiment with pure comparative fault found that pure comparative fault did not substantially
alter judicial costs as compared with the traditional contributory negligence rule:
The new rule did not affect the preference for jury trials in personal injury cases; did not
appreciably affect the length of trials; increased potential litigation; promoted before-trial
settlements; and made damages harder to determine. But the net tendency was not to tip the
balance markedly in either direction.
Rosenberg, ComparativeNegligence in Arkansas: A "Before and After" Survey, 13 ARK. L. Rnv.
89 (1959). A second survey, conducted after Arkansas switched from pure to modified comparative
negligence, reported an increased tendency toward settlement, but no change in the volume of litigation,
and no apparent impact on the length of trial or the preference for jury trials. Note, Comparative
Negligence-A Survey of the Arkansas Experience, 22 Ark. L. Rev. 692 (1969).
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spreading. On balance, it appears that the pure rule would be more efficient
as well as more fair than the modified rule of comparative negligence.
C.

Purification of Pure Comparative Fault

West Virginia already has a rule of pure comparative contribution, and
adoption of pure comparative negligence would be a major step toward a system
of pure comparative fault. But a truly "pure" system of comparative fault
would extend loss allocation and the principle of proportionate responsibility
to all parties in all tort actions, regardless of the legal theories and regardless
of the nature of the parties' misconduct.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has taken several significant
steps in that direction, but it has not yet extended the defense of comparative
fault to defendants guilty of aggravated misconduct. Nor has it indicated whether
principles of comparative fault would apply to plaintiffs guilty of aggravated
remain an absolute bar to recovery even under commisconduct, which may
146
negligence.
parative
Prior to the advent of comparative negligence, any contributory negligence
by the plaintiff, "however slight,"' 147 provided an absolute defense. To ameliorate this harsh rule, the common law developed numerous exceptions, including the rules that a plaintiff's contributory negligence would not be a bar
when a defendant had the "last clear chance,' '1 48 when a defendant was subject
to strict liability, 49 or when a defendant's negligence was willful and wanton. 15 0
These doctrines are no longer necessary under comparative negligence, and
their continued existence would conflict with the goal of loss allocation in a
system of comparative fault. When both parties are at fault, corrective justice
requires that each bear a fair share of the losses. Yet under the various exceptions to the contributory negligence rule, the fault of the plaintiff is disregarded and the entire loss is borne by the defendant. Now that the plaintiff's
negligence is not an absolute bar but simply reduces the recovery proportionately, there is no need for exceptions that would completely bar consideration

See, e.g., Draney v. Bachman, 138 N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409 (1976).
See, e.g., Crum v. Ward, 146 W. Va. 421, 122 S.E.2d 18 (1961); Morton v. Baber, 118 W.
Va. 457, 190 S.E. 767 (1937).
'4'

'41

','

See Ratlief v. Yokum, 280 S.E.2d 584, 588 (%V.Va. 1981) (overruling the doctrine); Bradley,

163 NV. Va. at 335, 256 S.E.2d at 882 (1979) (dictum); Barr v. Curry, 137 W. Va. 364, 71 S.E.2d 313
(1952); Donley, Observations on Last Clear Chance in West Virginia, 37 W. VA. L.Q. 362 (1931); Donley,
Last Clear Chance-Some Further Observations, 49 W. VA. L.Q. 51 (1942).
119See Bradley, 163 W. Va. at 336, 256 S.E.2d at 882 (dictum).
'- Id., 256 S.E.2d at 882 (dictum); Korzun v. Shahan, 151 W. Va. 243, 151 S.E.2d 287 (1966);
Barr, 137 W. Va. 364, 71 S.E.2d 313; Stone v. Rudolph, 127 W. Va. 335, 32 S.E.2d 742 (1944).
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of the plaintiff's negligence and place the entire loss on the defendant.", The
jury can reach a just result in all cases by comparing the fault of the plaintiff
with the fault of the defendant, so each party bears its appropriate share of
the losses.
Considerations of efficiency also require that each wrongdoer bear its proportionate share of the damages it causes. Although it is debatable whether
legal rules have a substantial influence on incentives to take care among potential plaintiffs, a rule that allowed negligent plaintiffs to recover one hundred
percent of their damages would at least marginally tend toward an inefficient
reduction in safety precautions. "1 2 More importantly, allocative efficiency requires that damaging activities bear the costs of the damages they cause. To
the extent that plaintiffs' damages are not reduced in proportion to their fault
in causing or contributing to an accident, their damage-causing activities receive
an implicit subsidy at the expense of the defendants' activities, distorting the
overall allocation of resources.
Complete apportionment of damages also Nyould promote loss spreading
and risk spreading. The losses would be shared by the plaintiff and the defendant, rather than falling entirely on the defendant. This primary loss spreading
between the parties is especially important with respect to intentional torts,
because many insurance policies do not cover liability for intentional torts, "5
leaving defendants to bear these losses themselves.
In Bradley, the court initially stated that its decision would not alter the
rules barring consideration of the plaintiff's negligence when the defendant had
the last clear chance, was subject to strict liability, or was guilty of willful or
wanton misconduct.154 Nevertheless, two years later the court eliminated the
last clear chance rule, stating that "the historical reason for the doctrine of
last clear chance no longer exists since our adoption of comparative negligence."' 15 The following year, the court held that comparative negligence could
be raised as a defense in actions based on strict liability. 5 6 It is unclear, however, whether the court will so easily reject the rule barring the defendant from

" Davis v. United States, 716 F.2d 418, 429 (7th Cir. 1983); Plyler v. Wheaton Van Lines, 640
F.2d 1091, 1093 (9th Cir. 1981); Sorensen v. Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 725, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441,

446 (1980).
I In American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy, 466 So.2d 1079, 1085 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), the court
said: "We think that as an incentive for care on the part of potential tort claim plaintiffs, the comparatively negligent plaintiff should bear his fair share of the loss even where the defendant tortfeasor's
conduct has been egregious."
"I McNichols, Should Comparative Responsibility Ever Apply to Intentional Torts?, 37 OKLA. L.
Rav. 641, 683 (1984).
' Bradley, 163 W. Va. at 335-36, 345-46, 256 S.E.2d at 882, 887.
155Ratlief, 280 S.E.2d 584, 589.
15

Star Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854.
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asserting the plaintiffs simple negligence as a defense when the defendant is

guilty of aggravated misconduct.
In other comparative negligence jurisdictions, there is a diversity of opinion
as to which forms of aggravated misconduct by a defendant, if any, are subject

to comparison with the plaintiff's negligence. At one end of the spectrum, there
is general agreement that apportionment should be permitted when the defend-

ant is guilty only of "gross negligence. "157 At the other end of the spectrum,
there is virtual unanimity in the case law that comparative negligence is no
defense when the defendant's conduct is intentional.1 58 In between, the courts
are fairly evenly split on the question of whether defendants guilty of "reckless,
willful, or wanton" misconduct may raise a comparative negligence defense.' 5 9
The apparent split of authority on the applicability of comparative negligence when the defendant is guilty of reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct
is misleading. Most of the decisions refusing to apply the defense involve an
interpretation of the particular state's comparative negligence statute: they hold

only that the legislature did not intend the statutory term "negligence" to encompass reckless, willful, or wanton misconduct. 6 ' When the language of the
state statute is broader, referring to "culpable conduct" or "fault," defendants
guilty of aggravated misconduct generally are permitted to raise a comparative
negligence defense.' 6 ' Likewise, in jurisdictions where comparative negligence
was adopted by the judiciary, the courts have more readily extended principles
of comparative fault to cases in which defendants were guilty of aggravated

L5Annot., 10 A.L.R. 4th 946, 952-55 (1981). E.g., PedernalesElec. Coop., Inc., 583 S.W.2d 882;
Tampa Elec. Co. v. Stone & Webster Eng'g Corp., 367 F. Supp. 27 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (Fla. law).
' V. ScirwARz, supra note 2, at § 5.2; H. WooDs, supra note 2, at § 7.1. But see Comeau v.
Lucas, 90 A.D.2d 674, 455 N.Y.S.2d 871 (1982) (apportioning damages in a battery case in which the
plaintiff was involved in a drunken brawl with one of the defendants); Lomonte v. A & P Food Stores,
107 Misc. 2d 88, 438 N.Y.S.2d 54 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) (plaintiff 75% at fault in provoking battery).
Dictum supporting a comparative negligence defense to intentional torts is also found in Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 774 F.2d 909, 913 (8th Cir. 1985) (discussing Arkansas
law).
159V. Sc.vlARz, supra note 2, at § 5.3; H. WOODS, supra note 2, at § 7.2; Annot., 10 A.L.R.
4th 946 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
- See e.g., Davies v. Butler, 95 Nev. 763, 602 P.2d 605 (1979); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d
187 (Wyo. 1979); Ryan v. Foster & Marshall, Inc., 556 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1977)(Ore. law); Draney,
138 N.J. Super. 503, 351 A.2d 409. On the other hand, several courts have held that the reckless, willful,
or wanton misconduct constituted "negligence" within the meaning of the state statute. Stockman v.
Marlowe, 271 S.C. 334, 247 S.E.2d 340 (1978); Billingsley v. Westrac Co., 365 F.2d 619 (8th Cir. 1966)
(Ark. law); Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Montgomery, 487 F. Supp. 1268 (W.D. Okla. 1980) (Okla. law).
See generally V. ScHwAgRz, supra note 2, at §§ 5.1-5.4.
"I E.g., Comeau, 90A.D.2d 674, 455 N.Y.S.2d 871 ("culpable" conduct in statute includes battery);
Wing v. Morse, 300 A.2d 491 (Me. 1973) ("fault" in statute may range from trivial inadvertance to
the grossest recklessness); Johnson v. Tilden, 278 Or. 11, 562 P.2d 1188 (1977) (comparative "fault"
statute applied to plaintiff's claim involving gross negligence of defendant under guest statute).
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misconduct. 162 The commentators also seem to favor the availability of a comparative negligence defense for defendants guilty of willful, wanton, or reckless
misconduct.163
Surprisingly, however, these authorities draw the line at intentional misconduct. Most of the commentators who have addressed the relationship between comparative fault and intentional torts either reject apportionment
entirely' 64 or else favor apportionment only in cases in which the defendant's
conduct is technically "intentional" but not truly deliberate. 65 Yet virtually
all of the arguments for and against allowing defendants guilty of aggravated
misconduct to raise a comparative negligence defense are fully applicable to
intentional torts. Accordingly, to simplify the following analysis, all of the
arguments against allowing defendants guilty of aggravated misconduct to raise
a comparative negligence defense will be summarized and refuted together,
without separate consideration of intentional tortfeasors.
Apart from the language of particular statutes, the first obstacle to comparing the plaintiff's negligence to the fault of a defendant guilty of aggravated
misconduct is the assertion that the misconduct of the defendant is "different
in kind" and therefore not subject to comparison. 166 This argument is a holdover from the era of contributory negligence, when it served as the rationale
for the rule that a plaintiff's contributory negligence would not bar recovery
when the defendant was guilty of aggravated misconduct.167 The various categories of fault-strict liability, negligence, recklessness, willfulness, wantonness, and intentionality-are not different in kind. Rather, they represent a

"I E.g., American Cyanamid Co., 466 So.2d at 1085; Davis, 716 F.2d 418 (l law); Plyler, 640
F.2d 1091 (Calif. law); Sorensen, 112 Cal. App. 3d 717, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441 (defense allowed concerning
willful and wanton misconduct). But see Munoz v. Olin, 76 Cal. App. 3d 85, 142 Cal. Rptr. 667 (1977),
vacated, 24 Cal. 3d 629, 156 Cal. Rptr. 729 (1979) (comparative negligence inapplicable to claim of
battery and defense of privilege).
1' V. ScmVARwz, supra note 2, at 106; Note, supra note 15, at 1681-82.
'6 Id.

'6 Dear & Zipperstein, Comparative Fault and Intentional Torts: Doctrinal Barriers and Policy
Considerations, 24 SANTA CLARA L. Rv. 1 (1984) (proposing extension of comparative fault principles
to non-self-help torts such as nuisance, but not to battery or other self-help torts); McNichols, supra
note 153 (proposing comparative responsibility when plaintiff's fault exceeds defendant's, when plaintiff
would not be entitled to punitive damages, when defendant's conduct is intentionally tortious in a
technical sense but is essentially negligent, or when the defendant raises issues of privilege that turn on
the reasonableness of defendant's conduct). But see Note, supra note 66, at 191 (recommending extension
of comparative fault to all intentional torts).
'6 Cases making this argument with respect to willful and wanton misconduct include Davies, 95
Nev. at 771-72, 602 P.2d at 610; Danculovich, 593 P.2d at 193. The cases that make this argument
with respect to intentional torts are discussed and criticized in McNichols, supra note 153, at 659, 679;
Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 165, at 11-18; Note, supra note 66, at 185-86.
167 McNichols, supra note 153, at 654; Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 165, at 9-18.
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continuum, involving varying degrees of culpability,1 68 and the courts have not
even been capable of drawing clear distinctions among them.1 69 These nominal
distinctions are not in any sense a barrier to comparisons of fault. Juries are
already apportioning fault between negligent consumers and strictly liable manufacturers,1 70 as well as between strictly liable manufacturers and employers
guilty of aggravated misconduct,' 7' so they are perfectly capable of apportioning
72
fault between intentional wrongdoers and their negligent victims.1
A second line of argument invokes principles of corrective justice, asserting73
that apportionment would conflict with the goal of compensating plaintiffs,'
or that serious wrongdoers do not "deserve" a reduction in their damages based
on the negligence of the plaintiff.' 74 The simple ans'ver is that regardless of
the degree of the defendants' misconduct, plaintiffs do not deserve compensation to the extent that they are at fault, and justice does not require defendants to pay more than their proportionate share of the losses caused by the
fault of both parties.' 75 Moreover, if apportionment is not permitted for certain
categories of aggravated misconduct, the imprecision of the dividing line can
be expected to produce a substantial number of arbitrary and unfair decisions.
76
Third, it is suggested that apportionment would undercut the deterrent'
and punitive 77 impact of damages for intentional or other aggravated misconduct, or that it would appear to sanction or condone conduct offensive to social
norms.' 78 Yet it is debatable whether the prospect of tort liability is a significant
deterrent to serious wrongdoers,' 79 and in any event it is doubtful whether the
deterrent effect of existing tort law would be substantially reduced by the prospect of diminished damage liability in cases in which the plaintiff was partially
at fault.

"I Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 165, at 11-18; Sorensen, 112 Cal. App. 3d at 725, 169 Cal.
Rptr. at 445 ("we are not here comparing apples and oranges.. .but rather two varieties of oranges... or
at worst oranges and lemons"); Wing, 300 A.2d 491.
'1 Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 165, at 16-18. See discussion supra notes 66 and accompanying
text.
1. E.g., Star Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d 854.
'7, E.g., Sydenstricker, 169 W. Va. 440, 288 S.E.2d 511.
172 Cf. the discussion supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text concerning comparative contribution
among defendants guilty of aggravated misconduct.
McNichols, supra note 153, at 684-85.
'
"T Davies, 95 Nev. at 772-73, 602 P.2d at 611; Draney, 138 N.J. Super. at 506-07, 351 A.2d at
411.
7 American Cyanamid Co., 466 So. 2d at 1085.
'16 V. ScHswARs'z, supra note 2, at 106; McNichols, supra note 153, at 679-80; Note, supra note
15, at 1681.
'" Note, supra note 15, at 1681.
'n McNichols, supra note 153, at 681; Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 165, at 19.
'" Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 165, at 18-19 and n.85; Note, supra note 66, at 186.
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More importantly, to the extent that apportionment reduces the deterrent
impact of a judgment against the defendant, deterrence can be supplemented
through an award of punitive damages against serious wrongdoers. 80 Likewise,
to the extent that retribution remains a goal of the system, it can be accomplished through an award of punitive damages.'' These punitive damages would
be based entirely on the conduct and resources of the defendant, and82 should
not be subject to apportionment based on the plaintiff's negligence.
It is also not true that an apportionment of the compensatory damages
would sanction or condone intentional or other aggravated misconduct. Juries
can be expected to allocate an appropriately large share of fault to defendants
guilty of outrageous misconduct' and to supplement their verdicts with punitive damages. On the other hand, the absence of apportionment could create
the impression that potential victims need not exercise care for their own safety.
Although individuals probably do not take additional risks in reliance on the
prospect of recovery in litigation, societal attitudes toward risk taking may be
subtly influenced by the general rules governing tort liability. Apportionment
of damages under pure comparative fault would send a better message to potential plaintiffs without undermining the educational function of the tort system with respect to serious misconduct by defendants.
Finally, those who oppose comparative fault for intentional torts assert that
it would raise additional issues in tort litigation, thereby increasing administrative costs. 8 4 They further argue that as a practical matter the actual amount
of mitigation would be slight, so that the difference would not be worth the
added administrative burden.' 85 Yet application of comparative fault to intentional torts would decrease rather than increase administrative costs. Allowing

See discussion supra at notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
1" Id. See also American Cynamid Co., 466 So. 2d at 1085; Dear & Zipperstein, supra note 165,
at 18-19; Note, supra note 66, at 187.
11A
majority of the reported cases hold that apportionment applies only to compensatory damages
and not to punitive damages. Annot., 27 A.L.R. 4th 318 (1984 & Supp. 1986). See also Annot., 10
A.L.R. 4th 946, 955-56 (1981). The rationale for not apportioning the punitive damages based on the
plaintiff's negligence is that since the purpose of these damages is to punish the defendant and not to
compensate the plaintiff, the award bears no relationship to the plaintiff's conduct. Tampa Elec. Co.,
367 F. Supp. 27 (Fla. law); Shahrokhfar v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 634 P.2d 653 (Mont.
1981); Amoco Pipeline Co., 487 F. Supp. 1268 (Okla. law). In West Virginia, however, the recognized
purposes of punitive damages include compensating the plaintiff for infliction of egregious misconduct
and substitution for personal revenge. Peny, 299 S.E.2d at 11-12; Hensley, 168 W. Va. 172, 283 S.E.2d
227. Insofar as compensation is a purpose of punitive damages in West Virginia, it may be appropriate
to reduce those damages to the extent of the plaintiff's own fault.
13 See Tampa Elec. Co., 367 F. Supp. 27; Emch, supra note 58, at 506; Note, supra note 15, at
1682. Cf. discussion supra at note 68 and accompanying text concerning comparative contribution among
defendants guilty of aggravated misconduct.
11,McNichols, supra note 153, at 681; Note, supra note 15, at 1681.
'

18 Id.
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serious tortfeasors to raise a partial defense of comparative fault would insert
an additional issue in certain cases, but it would also simplify a larger number
of cases by eliminating the need to determine whether the defendant's conduct
was intentional rather than willful, or willful rather than reckless.' 8 6 As long
as there was a limited category of cases in which comparative negligence did
not apply, plaintiffs would plead and attempt to prove that the defendant's
conduct fell within that category, and a great deal of additional discovery and
trial effort would be spent litigating that single issue.1 7 Moreover, the boundaries of any such categories would be imprecise, increasing the uncertainty for
the parties and impeding settlement negotiations."' A pure system of comparative fault would allow juries to consider the relative fault of all parties in
every case, dispensing with the need for case-by-case determinations of whether
apportionment applied.
Even if extension of comparative fault as a defense to intentional torts
were to raise, rather than reduce, the costs of litigation, the added administrative costs would be justified by the resulting improvement in loss allocation.
Contrary to the assertion that the degree of apportionment would rarely be
significant, in two reported battery cases the plaintiff's damages were diminished by twenty-five percent 8 9 and seventy-five percent. 190 Significant apportionment also could be expected in nuisance litigation and in other cases in
which defendants could assert that their conduct was reasonable or privileged. 191
In sum, there are no persuasive arguments against the extension of comparative fault to defendants guilty of aggravated misconduct, including intentional misconduct. A pure system of comparative fault would apportion losses
in accordance with the goal of loss allocation. Considerations of corrective
justice and efficiency require that each party at fault bear its share of the losses.
Pure comparative fault would preserve appropriate incentives for all parties,
and it would be simpler to administer than any rule that denied apportionment
to a particular category of wrongdoers.
"I Determination of whether the defendant's misconduct exceeded a particular threshhold would
remain an issue, however, whenever the plaintiff sought punitive damages. V. SCHXVAaTZ, supra note
2 at 106.
"IsSee Note, supra note 66, at 189. It is ironic for McNichols to suggest that "comparative responsibility would unduly complicate intentional tort litigation," supra note 153, at 681, while entirely
overlooking the significant administrative costs associated with his various proposals for a limited extension of comparative fault to intentional torts.
11-See discussion supra notes 85, 141-44 and accompanying text, concerning claims for comparative
contribution by defendants guilty of aggravated misconduct.
Comeau, 90 A.D.2d 674, 455 N.Y.S.2d 871.
190 Lomonte, 107 Misc. 2d 88, 438 N.Y.S.2d 54.
191Even those commentators who oppose a general extension of comparative negligence to intentional torts nevertheless concede that the defense would perform a valuable function for these particular
categories of intentional torts. See McNichols, supra note 153, at 689-97; Dear & Zipperstein, supra
note 165, at 32-38.
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From what has already been said, it should be equally apparent that a pure
system of comparative fault also should apply when the plaintiff is guilty of
aggravated misconduct. Those courts that allow apportionment when the
defendant is guilty of aggravated misconduct also permit apportionment when
the plaintiff is guilty of aggravated misconduct. 192
V.

CONCLUSION

All systems of comparative negligence and comparative contribution derive
at least in part from the considerations of fairness and efficiency embodied in
the phrase "loss allocation." The goal of loss allocation in turn serves as a
unifying principle, facilitating evaluation of the various alternative rules of
comparative negligence and comparative contribution. This Article has demonstrated that corrective justice and economic efficiency are best promoted by
a system of pure comparative fault, including pure comparative negligence and
pure comparative contribution.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals took an important first step
toward loss allocation in Bradley, rejecting the traditional rule of contributory
negligence in favor of a modified rule of comparative negligence. It took a
major step forward in Sitzes when it adopted a rule of pure comparative contribution among tortfeasors. It would require only a small step beyond Sitzes
for the court to extend a right of contribution to tortfeasors guilty of reckless
or wanton misconduct, and another small step to allow contribution even to
tortfeasors guilty of intentional misconduct. The next major step, consistent
with Sitzes and with the general goal of loss allocation, would be the adoption
of pure comparative negligence. The final step would be the elimination of the
last vestiges of the contributory negligence rule by allowing the plaintiff's negligence to be compared with the fault of all defendants, including those guilty
of reckless, willful, wanton, or even intentional misconduct.' 93

,9 Davis, 716 F.2d 418 (parties guilty of willful and wanton misconduct); Comeau, 90 A.D.2d 674,
455 N.Y.S.2d 871 (mutual battery); Zavala v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 125 Cal. App. 3d 646, 178

Cal. Rptr. 185 (1981)(defendant negligent, plaintiff guilty of willful misconduct and 80% at fault);
Stockman, 271 S.C. 334, 247 S.E.2d 340 (parties guilty of willful and wanton misconduct). Cf. Draney,
138 N.J. Super, 503, 351 A.2d 409 (holding that comparative negligence does not apply to aggravated
misconduct; when only the defendant is guilty of aggravated misconduct, the plaintiff recovers 100%,

and when both parties are guilty of aggravated misconduct, the plaintiff is barred from recovery).
19

The court may already have taken this step in Brammer v. Taylor, 338 S.E.2d 207 (W. Va.

1985), holding that the jury should have been instructed to apply comparative negligence in a tort action
based on the defendant's failure to execute the codicil to a will. The plaintiffs had proceeded under

two legal theories: (1) the negligence of defendants in handling the execution of the purported codicil,
and (2) defendant's unauthorized practice of law. The plaintiffs had emphasized the second theory, which
could arguably be characterized as an intentional tort, and the court held that comparative negligence

would apply under either theory. Dictum in the case stated that comparative negligence would apply in
any tort action based on "negligence or fault".
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While it is conceivable that the West Virginia court could take each of
these steps, one formidable barrier blocks the path to judicial adoption of pure
comparative fault in West Virginia-stare decisis. Bradley is only eight years
old, and the court may be reluctant to so quickly overrule its own pathbreaking
decision. On the other hand, the court has emphasized its willingness to reject
prior precedent in the field of tort law,19 4 and all of its decisions since Bradley
have moved in the direction of pure comparative fault.' 95 Thus, it is possible
that the court could adopt pure comparative fault in piecemeal fashion over
the next few years.
The legislature, by contrast, can readily achieve a system of pure comparative fault almost overnight simply by adopting the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act. In its existing form, the UCFA provides for pure comparative negligence between the plaintiff and the defendants and pure comparative contribution among defendants. But the definition of fault in the UCFA is limited
to parties whose conduct is negligent, reckless, or subject to strict liability. This
Article further recommends an amendment to the language of section 1 of the
UCFA that would extend the system of pure comparative fault to all plaintiffs
and defendants, including those whose conduct was willful, wanton, or intentional. Adoption of the UCFA, as thus amended, would not only resolve the
issues discussed by Mr. Stoneking in his Article, it would represent significant
progress in the direction of efficiency and justice in West Virginia's tort law
system.

"' Sitzes, 169 W. Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 679; Bradley, 163 W. Va. at 350, 256 S.E.2d at 889;
Morningstar v. Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 162 W. Va. 857, 863-74, 253 S.E.2d 666, 670-76 (1979).
193See Ratlief, 280 S.E.2d 584 (abolishing doctrine of last dear chance in favor of comparative
negligence); Sydenstricker, 169 W. Va. 440, 288 S.E.2d 511 (allowing contribution between defendants
liable under different legal theories); Sitzes, 169 W. Va. 698, 289 S.E.2d 679 (mandating pure comparative
contribution among defendants, regardless of relative share of fault); Star Furniture Co., 297 S.E.2d
854 (applying comparative negligence to plaintiffs in product liability actions); Brammer, 338 S.E.2d at
214 n.8 (applying comparative negligence to a plaintiff in a tort action based on codicil to will; dictum
stating comparative negligence applicable to all actions based on fault).
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APPENDIX
Uniform Comparative Fault Act
Section 1. [Effect of Contributory Fault]
(a) In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or
death to person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the
claimant diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does
not bar recovery. This rule applies whether or not under prior law the claimant's
contributory fault constituted a defense or was disregarded under applicable
legal doctrines, such as last clear chance.
(b) "Fault" includes acts or omissions that are in any measure negligent
or reckless toward the person or property of the actor or others, or that subject
a person to strict tort liability. The term also includes breach of warranty,
unreasonable assumption of risk not constituting an enforceable express consent, misuse of a product for which the defendant otherwise would be liable,
and unreasonable failure to avoid an injury or to mitigate damages. Legal
requirements of causal relation apply both to fault as the basis for liability
and to contributory fault.
Section 2. [Apportionment of Damages]
(a) In all actions involving fault of more than one party to the action,
including third-party defendants and persons who have been released under
Section 6, the court, unless otherwise agreed by all parties, shall instruct the
jury to answer special interrogatories or, if there is no jury, shall make findings,
indicating:
(1) the amount of damages each claimant would be entitled to recover if
contributory fault is disregarded; and
(2) the percentage of the total fault of all of the parties to each claim that
is allocated to each claimant, defendant, third-party defendant, and person who
has been released from liability under Section 6. For this purpose the court
may determine that two or more persons are to be treated as a single party.
(b) In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall consider
both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of the
causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.
(c) The court shall determine the award of damages to each claimant, in
accordance with the findings, subject to any reduction under Section 6, and
enter judgment against each party liable on the basis of rules of joint-andseveral liability. For purposes of contribution under Sections 4 and 5, the court
also shall determine and state in the judgment each party's equitable share of
the obligation to each claimant in accordance with the respective percentages
of fault.
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(d) Upon motion made not later than [one year] after judgment is entered,
the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's equitable share of
the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate any uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to their respective percentages of fault. The party whose liability is
reallocated is nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing liability
to the claimant on the judgment.
Section 3. [Set-off]
A claim and counterclaim shall not be set off against each other, except
by agreement of both parties. On motion, however, the court, if it finds that
the obligation of either party is likely to be uncollectible, may order that both
parties make payment into court for distribution. The court shall distribute the
funds received and declare obligations discharged as if the payment into court
by either party had been a payment to the other party and any distribution of
those funds back to the party making payment had been a payment to him by
the other party.
Section 4. [Right of Contribution]
(a) A right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons
who are jointly and severally liable upon the same indivisible claim for the
same injury, death, or harm, whether or not judgment has been recovered
against all or any of them. It may be enforced either in the original action or
by a separate action brought for that purpose. The basis for contribution is
each person's equitable share of the obligation, including the equitable share
of a claimant at fault, as determined in accordance with the provisions of
Section 2.
(b) Contribution is available to a person who enters into a settlement with
only if the liability of the person against whom contribution is sought
claimant
a
has been extinguished and to the extent that the amount paid in settlement was
reasonable.
Section 5. [Enforcement of Contribution]
(a) If the proportionate fault of the parties to a claim for contribution has
been established previously by the court, as provided by Section 2, a party
paying more than his equitable share of the obligation, upon motion, may
recover judgment for contribution.
(b) If the proportionate fault of the parties to the claim for contribution
has not been established by the court, contribution may be enforced in a separate action, whether or not a judgment has been rendered against either the
person seeking contribution or the person from whom contribution is being
sought. (c) If a judgment has been rendered, the action for contribution must
be commenced within [one year] after the judgment becomes final. If no judg-
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ment has been rendered, the person bringing the action for contribution either
(1) must have discharged by payment the common liability within the period
of the statute of limitations applicable to the claimant's right of action against
him and commenced the action for contribution within [one year] after payment, or (2) agreed while action was pending to discharge the common liability
and, within [one year] after the agreement, have paid the liability and commenced an action for contribution.
Section 6. [Effect of Release]
A release, covenant not to sue or similar agreement entered into by a claimant and a person liable discharges that person from all liability for contribution,
but does not discharge any other person liable upon the same claim unless it
so provides. However, the claim of the releasing person against other persons
is reduced by the amount of the released person's equitable share of the obligation, determined in accordance with the provisions of Section 2.
Section 7. [Uniformity of Application and Construction]
This Act shall be applied and construed so as to effectuate its general
purpose to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this Act among
states enacting it.
Section 8. [Short Title]
This Act may be cited as the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
Section 9. [Severability]
If any provision of this Act or application of it to any person or circumstances is held invalid, the invalidity does not affect other provisions or applications of the Act that can be given effect without the invalid provision or
application, and to this end the provisions of this Act are severable.
Section 10. [Prospective Effect of Act]
This Act applies to all [claims for relief] [causes of action] accruing after
its effective date.
Section 11. [Repeal]
The following acts and parts of acts are repealed: ....
Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 12 U.L.A. 39-48 (Supp. 1987).
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